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INTRODUCTION
1. The Vienna Convention of 1980 for the International Sale of Goods
(the “Vienna Convention” or “CISG”) was entered into force in Greece on
1.2.1999 by virtue of law no. 2532/1997 (Gov. Gazette A 227/11.11.1997) and
has since then been applied and interpreted by fourteen Greek judgments.  The
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judgment of the Multi-Member Court of First Instance of Athens 4505/2009
(“Judgment  4505/2009”)  is,  if  not  the  most  important,  one  of  the  most
important cases.  Its importance is based not only on the CISG legal issues on
2
which  it  expressed  an  opinion,  but  also  on  the  particularities  (and
complexities) of its facts (its original text exceeds 100 pages and is still
unpublished  in  Greece).  On  this  basis  the  author  believes  that  the  full
understanding of the legal issues of Judgment 4505/2009 requires systematic
and, to the extent possible, detailed presentation of its complicated facts. It is
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noted that Judgment 4505/2009 also deals with important legal issues relating
to international jurisdiction  and Greek domestic civil law. However, this note
3
will only concentrate, with few exceptions, on legal issues relating to the
CISG.
I. FACTS4
A. Pre-Contractual Stage
2. A Greek authority (the “Authority”), through a Greek Ministry (the
“Ministry”) and in cooperation with a company owned by the Greek State who
manufactured arms/weapons (the “State Weapon Co.”), wanted to acquire
bullet-proof vests for its personnel. The State Weapon Co. undertook to
manufacture and supply the vests to the Authority. Prior to the conclusion of
the  relevant  manufacture and supply agreements,  the State Weapon  Co.
launched an international lowest-bidder tender for the procurement of bullet-
proof material to be used in the manufacture of the bullet-proof vests and sent
invitations to various manufacturers (including “X” Co., a Dutch corporation)
(the “Dutch Supplier”); the invitation included evaluation criteria for light
equipment of NIJ IIIa type set out in detail in the text of Judgment 4505/2009.
Based on the invitation of the State Weapon Co., “Y” Co., a Greek company
and a direct subsidiary of the State Weapon Co. (the “State Weapon Co.
Subsidiary”), offered to manufacture bullet-proof vests providing a level of
protection corresponding to the specifications set out by the National Institute
of the USA (NIJ) 0101.03, level IIA, with the understanding that the vests
would be tested in an official laboratory in accordance with the methods of
NIJ. On 14.2.2000, the Dutch Supplier submitted its financial tender to the
State Weapon Co. for a new experimental light bullet-proof material under the
name “D” (the “Bullet-Proof Material”); the financial tender of the Dutch
Supplier, inter alia, (i) set out specific temporary specifications for the Bullet-
Proof Material; (ii) pointed out that the Bullet-Proof Material was a new
product in the market and did not exist for enough time in order to have real
experience data; (iii) included a warranty by the Dutch Supplier that the
3. For English translation of the parts of Judgment 4505/2009 related to jurisdictional matters, see
Dionysios Flambouras, Editorial Remarks to Judgment 4505/2009, §§ 2.1.1–2.1.5, available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/094505gr.html.
4. For full presentation of facts and translation of the relevant legal parts of Judgment 4505/2009,
see Dionysios Flambouras, Editorial Remarks to Judgment 4505/2009, §§ 1.1–1.11, at http://cisgw3
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Bullet-Proof Material would maintain compliance with the specifications set
out in the technical manual issued for this type of material, for a “life”
expectancy of ten years from the date of delivery, provided that the terms set
out in the technical manual were complied with; and (iv) offered an amount
of 5 DM per kg of Bullet-Proof Material after the end of the period of use of
the bullet-proof vests. In order to select the supplier of the bullet-proof
material ballistic tests were conducted in the Institute of G. University in the
U.K.  in  November  2000.  The  tests  were  performed  on  prospective
unprocessed bullet-proof materials (including the Bullet-Proof Material) and
not on vests manufactured from such materials. Based on the results of the
tests the State Weapon Co. and the State Weapon Subsidiary Co. considered
the tender of the Dutch Supplier as the most advantageous and decided to
purchase from the latter the unprocessed Bullet-Proof Material, which would
be used by the State Weapon Subsidiary Co. in order to manufacture bullet-
proof vests for the Authority.
B. Contract for the Supply of Bullet-Proof Vests Between the State Weapon
Co. and the Ministry (Bullet-Proof Vests Supply Contract)
3.  On  21.6.2001  an  agreement  (no.  16A/2001)  was  concluded  (the
“Bullet-Proof Vests Supply Contract”) under which the State Weapon Co.
agreed to supply to the Ministry and the Authority 10,020 bullet-proof vests
with protection level IIA (the “Bullet-Proof Vests”) and 2,000 bullet-proof
slabs  with  protection  level  III.  The  Bullet-Proof  Vests  Supply  Contract
provided, inter alia, the following: (i) as regards the Bullet-Proof Material, the
Bullet-Proof Vests would originate from the Dutch Supplier; however, the
production and the control of the final product (i.e. the Bullet-Proof Vests)
would be performed by the State Weapon Co.; (ii) the State Weapon Co.
would have the exclusive responsibility for the qualitative examination of the
Bullet-Proof  Material  (and  any  relevant  technical  improvements-
modifications) to be performed at its premises; (iii) the contractual material
would be accompanied, upon delivery to the Ministry’s committee for the
final take over, with compliance certificates issued by the Dutch Supplier and
the State Weapon Co. which would cover the inland part, as well as the Bullet-
Proof Vest as a final product; (iv) following production of the Bullet-Proof
Vests by the State Weapon Co. and delivery of each instalment and receipt of
a relevant written notice by the Ministry, the Ministry would proceed with a
qualitative examination of the end product and qualitative receipt of the
product; (v) the Greek Weapon Co. warranted the good “behaviour” of the
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verification of a defect, the Ministry would provide a written notification to
the State Weapon Co., in connection with any defective part, which would be
covered by the contractual warranty and would return such defective part to
the premises of the State Weapon Co., accompanied by detailed relevant
minutes explaining the reasons for which repair or replacement is necessary
and State Weapon Co. would proceed with any necessary repair as soon as
possible at its own expenses; (vii) in the event that, within the warranty
period,  a  defective  part  of  the  same  material  appears  for  a  percentage
exceeding 10% of the goods received, such defect would be classified as
“systematic” and the State Weapon Co. would be obliged to replace the
defective  part  in  all  material,  free  of  charge for  the  Ministry;  (viii) the
technical characteristics-specifications for the Bullet-Proof Vests and the
process in order to effect macroscopic and operative control in connection
with the high standard of the Bullet-Proof Vests; (ix) that the State Weapon
Co. would manufacture 100% Bullet-Proof Vests and such manufacturing
would be performed at its premises or at the premises of its Greek sub-
contractors; and (x) that the State Weapon Co. would acquire Bullet-Proof
Material of 1.69 m width.
C. Contract for Sale of Bullet-Proof Material Between the Dutch Supplier
and State Weapon Subsidiary Co. (Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract)
4. On 4.7.2001 an agreement was concluded (the “Bullet-Proof Material
Sale Contract”) under which the Dutch Supplier (the “Seller”) agreed to sell
to the State Weapon Subsidiary Co. (the “Buyer”) Bullet-Proof Material (i.e.
“D”) under the following terms and conditions: (i) the Seller would sell to the
Buyer 155,000 linear meters (lm) of Bullet-Proof Material 160 cm wide for a
total price of €2,515,464 (Cl. 1); (ii) the Bullet-Proof Material would be
delivered to the Buyer in instalments as follows: 1st instalment 15,000 lm by
January 2002, 2nd instalment 20,000 lm by February 2002, 3rd instalment
20,000 lm by March 2002, 4th instalment 25,000 lm by April 2002, 5th
instalment 30,000 lm by May 2002, 6th instalment 30,000 lm by June 2002
and 7th instalment 15,000 lm by July 2002 (Cl. 2.1); (iii) the Department of
Purchase and the Department of Qualitative Examination of the Buyer would
take over each instalment and would perform initial examination of the Bullet-
Proof Material; during the process for the taking over and examination of the
Bullet-Proof Material the Seller or its authorised representative would be
present in order to execute a relevant protocol (Cl. 2.3); (iv) the Seller would
accompany  each  instalment  of  Bullet-Proof  Material  with  a  quality
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Buyer would be effected as follows: 40% of the total purchase price (i.e.
€1,006,185.60) would be paid in advance by 15 July 2001 against a bank
guarantee while the remaining balance (i.e. €1,509,278.40) would be paid in
instalments within thirty days upon receipt of an invoice for each delivery
instalment (Cl. 3.2); (vi) if the Bullet-Proof Material would not fully comply
with the specifications, the Buyer would be entitled to reject it in full or in
part (Cl. 4.1) and the Seller would be obliged to replace the rejected quantity
with a respective quantity of Bullet-Proof Material that would comply with the
specifications within 30 days following notification of the relevant report
prepared by the Department of Qualitative Examination of the Buyer; (vii) the
Seller warranted that the Bullet-Proof Material was free of any legal defect
and of any apparent or hidden defect for a period of one year starting from the
date of delivery (Cl. 7.3); (viii) the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract
provided that it would prevail over any other relevant document (in the
absence of manifest error) and that any amendment in its terms would only be
agreed in writing excluding any other manner for such amendment (Cl. 9.3).
D. Contract for the Manufacturing of Bullet-Proof Vests Between the State
Weapon Subsidiary Co. and the State Weapon Co. [Bullet-Proof Vests
Manufacturing Contract]
5. On 19.7.2001 an agreement was concluded (the “Bullet-Proof Vests
Manufacturing Contract”) under which the State Weapon Subsidiary Co.
(being Buyer under the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract)  undertook to
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manufacture and deliver to the State Weapon Co. the Bullet-Proof Vests and
2,000 bullet-proof slabs with protection level III (as set out in Schedule A to
the Bullet-Proof Vests Supply Contract) for a total price of €5,203,154.37
(plus  VAT).  The  Bullet-Proof  Vests  Supply  Contract   was  attached  as
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schedule  to  and  constituted  an  integral  part  to  the  Bullet-Proof  Vests
Manufacturing Contract. The State Weapon Subsidiary Co. declared that it
was fully aware of the terms and schedules A-H of the Bullet-Proof Vests
Supply Contract and the obligations that the State Weapon Co. had undertaken
towards the Ministry. It was further agreed that if the State Weapon Co. or the
Ministry would discover, until final take over, any defect or damage that could
be remedied in the Bullet-Proof Vests manufactured by the State Weapon
Subsidiary Co., they would be entitled to demand from the State Weapon
5. See supra ¶ 3.
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Subsidiary Co. to remedy such defect or damage at its own expenses within
the time frame set out in the Bullet-Proof Vests Supply Contract.
E. Partial Performance of the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract—Non-
Payment of Part of the Purchase Price
6. In the context of the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract, the Buyer
[i.e. State Weapon Subsidiary Co.] paid in advance to the Seller [i.e. Dutch
Supplier] on 12.6.2001 the amount of €1,006,185.60 (40% of the total price).
During the period between 11.1.2002 and 19.8.2002, the Seller delivered to
the  Buyer  in  instalments  (ten  “shipments”)  125,129  lm  of  Bullet-Proof
Material. Each instalment delivered was accompanied by an invoice and a
compliance certificate; in each compliance certificate: (i) it was confirmed
that the Bullet-Proof Material complied with the applicable manufacturing
specifications for the product level which had been examined, pursuant to the
internal  examination  procedures  adopted  by  the  Seller;  and  (ii)  specific
reference was made to the fact the Buyer should examine the fitness of the
level (i.e. of the Bullet-Proof Material) for the actual application and (the
Buyer) was not released of its obligation to conduct the usual examination for
the Bullet-Proof Material that it was taking over. Every instalment (shipment)
went through qualitative and quantitative examination by the Department of
Purchase and the Department of Qualitative Examination of the Buyer and the
Buyer never rejected any quantity of delivered Bullet-Proof Material. The
Buyer  timely  paid,  with  few  minor  delays,  the  price  for  the  first  six
instalments (shipments) of Bullet-Proof Material (approximately 125,000 lm
for €779,650). However, the Buyer did not pay within the agreed time frame
(and even though an additional 30-day extension period was granted) the price
for the subsequent four instalments (“shipments”) that it had already taken
over corresponding to 5,461 lm (value of €53,175.129), 25,000 lm (value of
€243,432),  24,600  lm  (value  of  €237,537.09)  and  24,600  lm  (value  of
€146,059.20).
F. Failure at 20.9.2002 Ballistic Test: Penetration of a Bullet-Proof Vest
7. Correspondence was exchanged between the Seller and the Buyer and
a meeting was held in Athens on 25.9.2002 where the Buyer’s representatives
assured the Seller that it would discharge the unsettled invoices by the end of
September 2002. Furthermore, the Seller was informed that on 20.9.2002, the
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the monitoring of the Bullet-Proof Vests Supply Contract,  proceeded, at the
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premises of the ballistic station of the company “P” owned by the Greek State
(the “Greek Ballistic Station”), with ballistic examination of a Bullet-Proof
Vest manufactured by the State Weapon Subsidiary Co. [under the Bullet-
Proof Vests Manufacturing Contract ] from sample Bullet-Proof Material
8
originating from the 5th instalment (“shipment”) of Bullet-Proof Material
(sold from the Dutch Supplier (Seller) to the State Weapon Subsidiary Co.
(Buyer)  under  the  Bullet-Proof  Material  Sale  Contract).   The  ballistic
9
examinations included shots with sub-machine-gun of 9 mm and MAGNUM
pistol 44 mm. The following ammunition was used: 9mmX 19 Full Metal
jacket Lot 304-IVI-79; this was not the ammunition set out in annex B of the
Bullet-Proof Vests Supply Contract  which should be used, under the Bullet-
10
Proof Vests Supply Contract, for the operating examination of the sample
Bullet-Proof Vest. In particular, during the ballistic examinations it was found
that in the 5th shot (out of 6 shots) with the MP5 sub-machine-gun, from a five
meter distance and with a speed of 426/15m/s, the Bullet-Proof Vest was
penetrated. In particular the Bullet-Proof Vest that was examined at the
ballistic tests was of an external type with a zip on the front side and each of
two  front  breastplates  was  covering  the  other  front  breastplate  for
approximately 10 cm; it was further noted that the “failure” occurred at the
imaginary line of the breastplates overlapping of the specific Bullet-Proof
Vest.
On 8.10.2002 and on 9.10.2002 the State Weapon Co. informed the Seller
(the Dutch Supplier) that it would suspend payments for the outstanding price
owed for delivered Bullet-Proof Material (under the Bullet-Proof Material
Sale Contract)  since the Ministry had also suspended payments owed under
11
the Bullet-Proof Vests Supply Contract  due to failure in the ballistic tests of
12
20.9.2002 and until a failure analysis is completed. Furthermore the Ministry
demanded (under the Bullet-Proof Vests Supply Contract) that the State
Weapon Co. replace the Bullet-Proof Material in the Bullet-Proof Vests that
had already been delivered (and the ones that would be delivered in the future)
7. See supra ¶ 3.
8. See supra ¶ 4.
9. See supra ¶ 4.
10. See supra ¶ 3.
11. See supra ¶ 4.
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with alternative bullet-proof material (as set out in the Failure Analysis
report ).
13
G. 30.10.2002 and 1.11.2002 Ballistic Tests—Failure Analysis
8. Due to the penetration of the Bullet-Proof Vest at the ballistic test of
20.9.2002 it was unanimously resolved by the Visiting Team for Qualitative
Examination of the State Weapon Co. and the representatives of the Authority
that the State Weapon Co. should proceed with a Failure Analysis of the
incident  in  order  to  establish  whether  the  incident  was  accidental  or
constituted systematic failure. On 30.10.2002, ballistic tests took place in the
Greek Ballistic Station where model frames of 40cmX40cm were tested for
which samples of Bullet-Proof Material were used originating from the same
lot of production and one sample originated from the roll of Bullet-Proof
Material that was used in order to manufacture the Bullet-Proof Vest that was
penetrated in the ballistic test of 20.9.2002. 80 shots were performed with an
MP5 gun, from five meters distance and with the speed of 426+/-25m/s in the
presence of representatives of the Seller (Dutch Supplier); these shots did not
show any unusual behavior of the Bullet-Proof Material in order to render it
suspicious for the causing of failure.
Having evaluated the ballistic tests with the Bullet-Proof Material, the
failure analysis dated 10.3.2003 (the “Failure Analysis”) concluded that from
the results of the ballistic tests, one could not attribute the failure of the
Bullet-Proof Vest to a systematic failure of the Bullet-Proof Material from
which the Bullet-Proof Vest was manufactured. Since in the ballistic tests of
20.9.2002 the failure occurred at the imaginary line of overlapping of the two
chest  covers  of  the  specific  Bullet-Proof  Vest,  in  the  ballistic  tests  of
30.10.2002  the  design  of  the  Bullet-Proof  Vest  was  tested  by  using  an
equation model in order to check the effect of the design factor. In particular
five shots took place on 1.11.2002 in the Greek Ballistic Station at the
equation  model  for  the  relevant  type  of  Bullet-Proof  Vest  and  the
circumstances  in which the failure appeared during the ballistic tests of
20.9.2002; these five shots were performed with the MP5 gun, from five
meters at a speed of 426 +/- 15m/s and one penetration appeared without
deformation of the bullet, whereas in the other four shots the bullets were
deformed. Having evaluated the above ballistic tests over the equation model
for the design of the Bullet-Proof Vest, the Failure Analysis concluded, inter
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alia, the following: (i) that the penetration was a strong indication of bad
operation (failure) of the Bullet-Proof Material in the specific design of the
Bullet-Proof Vest; (ii) that the tendency of the fiber (to be penetrated) in the
event of unidirectional structure of the Bullet-Proof Material when the chests
are  overlapping,  was  clearly  larger  in  comparison  with  the  case  of
homogeneous  substratum;  and  (iii)  that  the  resistance  of  the  chest  to
penetration was relative to the resistance of the fibers, which in the event of
non-homogenous substratum was more distressed and as a result an increased
possibility of penetration appeared. It was further noted that at those shots, the
following  ammunition  was  used,  i.e.,  9X9mm  NATO  of  the  Canadian
company IVI (LOT 304-I.V.I.-79), with a nominal mass of bullet 7.5g. (115
grains) and not the ammunition provided by annex B (part of the operating test
of the Bullet-Proof Vests) of the Bullet-Proof Vests Supply Contract.  In
14
addition, during the test there were high speeds V2 (average of 434 m/s), in
comparison to the requirements of the specification set out in the Bullet-Proof
Vests Supply Contract (426 m/s), while four out of those counted during test
speeds V2 (out of 18), were exceeding the limit set by the above specification
(441  m/s).  At  the  end,  the  Failure  Analysis  suggested,  as  best  possible
operation  of  bullet-proof  material  in  fabric  form,  the  aramidic  material
(Kevlar, Twaron) which is also available in fabric form in comparison to the
structure of the Bullet-Proof Material; this suggestion was due to the fact that
in tests conducted on 6.12.2002 at the Greek Ballistic Station with an MP5
gun, from a distance of five meters and speed of 426 +/- m/s, with ten shots
at an equation sample of 40cmX40cm of Twaron CT 709wrt (29 Layers)
which was placed on top of an equation sample of 40cmX20cm of Bullet-
Proof Material, it appeared that there was no penetration and that the bullets
were  deformed  regularly  and  symmetrically,  which  constituted  a  strong
indication that the causes which resulted in failure did not exist anymore.
H. Exchange of Correspondence Between Seller and Buyer—Seller’s and
Buyer’s Arguments
9. Correspondence was exchanged between the Seller (Dutch Supplier)
and the Buyer (State Weapon Subsidiary Co.) from which it is concluded that
the Buyer did not discharge the three outstanding invoices of aggregate
amount of €438,771.58, that the Seller offered to assist the Buyer and suggest
a solution to the design problem of the bullet-proof vest and asked the Buyer
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to send to it a sample vest of the ones used in the ballistic test of 20.9.2002
and that the Seller requested a third company to manufacture on behalf of the
Buyer the specific equation sample and following relevant tests it had found
alternative solutions for the penetration problem faced by the Bullet-Proof
Vest that the Buyer [State Weapon Subsidiary Co.] had manufactured for the
Authority having used Bullet-Proof Material. The Seller demanded discharge
of  the  outstanding  amount  and  asked  the  Buyer  to  take  delivery  of  the
remaining quantity (29,871 l m) of the Bullet-Proof Material which had not
yet been delivered to the Buyer under the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract.
The Buyer informed the Seller that the Failure Analysis  showed that there
15
was a problem arising from the combination of the Bullet-Proof Material used
for the specific type of Bullet-Proof Vest (with zip), of which the Buyer was
not informed, since possibly this problem did not occur in the past to the
Seller;  furthermore  the  Buyer  asked  the  Seller  to  dispose  otherwise  the
remaining quantity of Bullet-Proof Material (29,871 lm) since this quantity
was not really necessary for the materialisation of the Bullet-Proof Material
Sale Contract. Then the Seller acknowledged that the problem in the design
of the Bullet-Proof Material with the specific design of some Bullet-Proof
Vests (with zip) was not new to the Seller and this was confirmed in the
ballistic tests that took place on 30.10.2002 and 1.11.2002  where it was
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found that the problem was not caused by the Bullet-Proof Material, but by the
combination of the specific design of the Bullet-Proof Vests (manufactured
from Bullet-Proof Material) and the type of specific ammunition that caused
the problem. The Seller further confirmed that it had a suspicion that the
design of the Bullet-Proof Vest and the type of ammunition used may have a
decisive effect on the performance of the Bullet-Proof Material even if the
latter as raw material is of the best quality, and once again confirmed that the
Bullet-Proof Material delivered to the Buyer fully satisfied the specifications
set  out  for  it.   Then  the  Seller:  (i)  made  clear  that  there  was  no
17
interconnection between the quality of the Bullet-Proof Material and the
performance of the Bullet-Proof Vests, (ii) expressed its disappointment since
the Buyer did not liaise in order to resolve the problem by providing a
defective Bullet-Proof Vest to the Seller and the ammunition used in order for
the Seller to make a test; (iii) asked the Buyer to pay the three outstanding
invoices of an aggregate amount of €438,771.58; and (iv) declared that the
15. See supra ¶ 8.
16. See supra ¶ 8.
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Seller would not accept the cancellation of the delivery of the 29,871 lm of
Bullet-Proof Material for which the Buyer had placed an order (and thus the
Buyer was obliged to take delivery of the 29,871 lm of Bullet-Proof Material
still to be delivered under the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract). Then the
Seller requested payment of the outstanding amount of €438,771.58 and
informed the Buyer that it had found alternative solutions for the problem in
connection with the Bullet-Proof Vest. The Buyer did not answer.
I. Ballistic Test by the Seller in a Certified Laboratory in the Netherlands—
Offer by the Seller to Remedy the Problem of the Bullet-Proof Vests with
the Adding of Improving Material
10. From a number of letters it resulted that the Seller had proceeded at
its own expense to a ballistic test at a certified international laboratory in the
Netherlands where it used a model of the Bullet-Proof Vest that the Buyer
(State  Weapon  Subsidiary  Co.)  had  manufactured  and  delivered  to  the
Authority. At this ballistic test, tenths of shots were performed with stronger
ammunition in particular along the gap which existed at the point that the two
front parts of the Bullet-Proof Vest are unified and it was found that no
problem existed (there was no penetration). Then, an improving material was
added with further positive results and a representative of the Seller (Dutch
Supplier) delivered samples of this improving material to a representative of
the Authority, provided information as to its characteristics (that is 24 grams,
€0.33 price per vest) and at the same time indicated the manner of use which
was simple and practical.
J. Refusal of the Buyer to Use the Improving Material Suggested by the
Seller in Order to Remedy the Problem of the Bullet-Proof
Vests—Purchase by the Buyer of Different Improving Material
11. The Buyer did not manufacture samples of Bullet-Proof Vests with
the improving material that the Seller suggested.  On the opposite the Buyer
18
invited the Authority to participate in tests with a different improving material
(aramidic fibers, Kevlar). On 27.10.2003 the Buyer eventually concluded an
agreement for the purchase of such different bullet-proof material (aramidic
fibers, Kevlar) from a different supplier in order to repair (by adding this
bullet-proof  material)  the  6,900  Bullet-Proof  Vests  that  had  already
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manufactured and delivered to the Authority and to manufacture the remaining
1,020 Bullet-Proof Vests on the basis of such different bullet-proof material.
Accordingly, although the Failure Analysis  suggested to replace the vest
19
chest manufactured from Bullet-Proof Material with a vest made of Twaron
CT709wrt, the Buyer proceeded with the purchase of a different material
(aramidic fibers (Kevlar)), from another manufacturer, although it had tested
and rejected the latter material at the tests that took place in G. University for
the selection of material at the international tender stage.
20
K. Definite Refusal of the Buyer to Pay the Outstanding Purchase Price
and Take Delivery of the Remaining Quantity of Bullet-Proof Material
12. On 18.3.2004, the Buyer repeated to the Seller that the Authority did
not accept the Bullet-Proof Material due to the penetration of the Bullet-Proof
Vest at the ballistic tests of 20.9.2002  and it demanded from the Buyer the
21
repair of the 6,900 Bullet-Proof Vests that had already been delivered to it.
Furthermore, following (i) deduction of the amount of €202,722 as expenses
for the repair of the 6,900 Bullet-Proof Vests and (ii) set-off the advance
payment and the expenses for the tests, the Buyer concluded that it owed to
the Seller a remaining amount equal to €34,464.45 and it offered to pay this
amount (which it eventually did not). Finally on 21.4.2004, the Seller, by
means of a letter to the Buyer, denied any claim of the Buyer, and declared
that if the Buyer did not discharge the outstanding amount of €438,771.58 and
did  not  take  over  the  remaining  29,871  lm  of  Bullet-Proof  Material
corresponding to the amount of €484,770.48 (out of which it had already
prepaid the amount of €194,914.26), it would recourse to justice.
II. SELLER’S ACTION—LEGAL ISSUES AND SUBSTANCE—COURT’S
JUDGMENT—COMMENTARY
A. Seller’s Action
13. The Seller filed an action against the Buyer and requested that the
latter would be obliged to pay the total amount of €729,627.58 out of which:
19. See supra ¶ 8.
20. See supra ¶ 2.
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(i) the following amounts, i.e. €53,175.29, €239,537.09 and €146,059.20 on account
of the three unsettled invoices;  and
22
(ii) the amount of €290,856.22 as the consideration for the last quantity of Bullet-
Proof Material (11th shipment of 29,871 lm) that the Buyer did not take delivery
of.
23
In particular, as regards the above request, the Seller refers the following in
his action:
[T]hat the Buyer, despite the fact that it never claimed that the Bullet-Proof Material
supplied by the Seller did not meet the conditions of the Bullet-Proof Material Sale
Contract thus clarifying from the start that the problem discovered in the Bullet-Proof
Vests manufactured for the Authority was due to the inappropriate design thereof and not
the quality of the Bullet-Proof Material, by invoking (the Buyer) that it did not receive
payment from the Authority nor was it reimbursed for the cost of repairing the Bullet-
Proof Vests, it refused to settle the price of the quantity  of Bullet-Proof Material
delivered by the Seller and to accept the delivery of the last order (instalment) of Bullet-
Proof Material, thus (the Seller) sustaining positive and negative (sequential) losses
(damages) which amounts to a total of €729,627.58.
24
In addition, the Seller requested the Buyer to pay to it the amount of €500,000
as compensation for moral damages sustained (damage to its international
reputation) since:
(i) the fact that the Buyer illegally declared the Bullet-Proof Material
Sale  Contract  concluded  between  it  and  the  Seller  avoided,  in
conjunction with the conclusion of a new agreement with another
supplier-competitor,  resulted to the Seller’s forced removal from
25
the relevant market and to damage to its international reputation; and
(ii) the Buyer, following its unjustified replacement from the Seller,
stated in practice to any recipient in the Greek and the international
market that the failure (penetration of the Bullet-Proof Vest) was due
to a certain problem of the Bullet-Proof Material supplied by the
Seller and not to a defect in the design and manufacture of the
Bullet-Proof Vests by the Buyer,
and as a result of the above behaviour of the Buyer and its defamatory
statements, the Seller sustained moral damages for the restitution of which the
Seller is entitled to monetary satisfaction.
26
22. See supra ¶¶ 6, 12.
23. See supra ¶¶ 9, 12.
24. Judgment 4505/2009 at 30–31.
25. See supra ¶ 11.
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B. Judgment of the Court on the Seller’s Action
(1) Applicable Provisions
14.  In  connection  to  the  request  of  the  Seller  for  the  payment  of
€729,627.58  the court judged that the action was legally grounded based on
27
articles 1, §§ 1(á), 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 25, 30, 31, 33, 35, 53, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 66,
67, 69, 74, 78, 99 and 100 of the CISG.
28
(2) Seller’s Action: Application of the CISG in the Bullet-Proof Material
Sale Contract
15.  The  Court  rightly  judged  that  the  Bullet-Proof  Material  Sale
Contract  was governed by the CISG since on one hand, the Seller had its
29
principal place of business in the Netherlands and the Buyer had its principal
place of business in Greece (both Netherlands and Greece were Contracting
States)  and on the other, during the time the Bullet-Proof Material Sale
30
Contract was concluded (4.7.2001), the Vienna Convention had already been
put into place in the Netherlands and Greece.  Furthermore, the Vienna
31
Convention applied in accordance with article 1, § 1(b) of the CISG. More
specifically, the Court rightly pointed out that “in case the parties selected the
law of a country to be the applicable law, the provisions of the Vienna
Contract  apply,  to  the  extent  that  it  has  been  ratified  by  this  specific
country.”  Based on the actual facts, the court concluded that pursuant to
32
clauses 8.3 and 8.4 of the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract, the contracting
parties had agreed that Greek law would be the substantial and procedural
applicable law for the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract.  In view of the
33
27. See supra ¶ 13.
28. The legal part of Judgment 4505/2009 includes numerous recitals of principles of law together
with extensive references to Greek legal doctrine and case law; for translated excerpts of these recitals see
Flambouras, supra note 3, at §§ 2.1–2.4.1 & 3.
29. See supra ¶ 4.
30. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 1, § 1(a),
U.N. Doc. A/CONG.97/18, Annex 1 (Apr. 11, 1980) [hereinafter CISG].
31. Judgment 4505/2009 at 9–10 systematically set out the subjective, objective, local and time
conditions for the application of CISG; for English translation of the relevant excerpts, see Dionysios
Flambouras, Editorial Remarks to Judgment 4505/2009, § 2.2.4, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/094505gr.html. See CISG art. 99, 100.
32. Judgment 4505/2009 at 9–10.
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above, since Greece had ratified the Convention, the latter applied to the
Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract also in accordance with article 1, § 1(b)
CISG.
34
(3) Seller’s Action: Non-Pecuniary Damage—Court’s Judgment on Legal
Issues
16. In connection to the request of the Buyer for monetary compensation
due to moral distress suffered by it, the court, in our opinion, rightly judged
that the action was not legally grounded to the extent that it was based on the
CISG provisions. In order to support this judgment the Court invoked the
following arguments: (i) that the non-pecuniary damage is not recovered under
the CISG;  and (ii) that based on the theory of foreseeability applied in the
35
CISG, the Buyer could not have foreseen (subjective foreseeability) neither
was he obliged to had foreseen (objective foreseeability) the invoked damage
to the professional reputation of the Seller as a possible consequence of the
contractual breach at the time the agreement was concluded.
36
34. See Oberlandesgericht [Appellate Court of Stuttgart] Germany 31 Mar. 2008, available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080331g1.html;  The  Travellers  Property  Cas.  Co.  of  America  and
Hellmuth Obata & Kassabaum, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Technical Fabrics Canada Limited, 2007 WL 313591
(D. Minn. 2007), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070131u1.html. See also BP Oil Int’l, Ltd.
v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2003), CLOUT Case No. 575 [Court of
Appeals  [5th  Circuit]  United  States,  11  June  2003],  available  at  http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
030611u1.html (“A signatory’s assent to the CISG necessarily incorporates the treaty as part of that nation’s
domestic law [. . .] Where parties seek to apply a signatory’s domestic law in lieu of the CISG, they must
affirmatively opt-out of the CISG.”).
35. Judgment 4505/2009 at 35. On the same opinion, see Anastássios Valtoudis, Liability for
Damages pursuant to the Vienna Convention (foundation, discharge from liability and extent of damages),
NORTHERN GREECE LAW UNION [ENOBE] 71–72 (2001). INGEBORG SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE
UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 1015 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg
Schwenzer eds., 3d ed. 2010) (“damages which are purely non-pecuniary may be recoverable where the
intangible purpose of performance became part of the contract, rendering the loss incurred a typical
consequence of non-performance”). Cf. Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeal of Linz] Austria, 23 Jan. 2006,
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060123a3.html (“Art. 25 CISG also applies to other kinds
of damage, e.g., [. . .] a detriment to the reputation of the well-performing party.”).
36. Judgment 4505/2009 at 17, 18, 35, (where the criteria for subjective and objective foreseeability
are analysed extensively; more specifically the following principle is stated: “Thus non-pecuniary damage
is not recoverable, as well as damage sustained by a contracting party to its professional reputation and
damage from loss of clientele due to the non-compliance by its counterparty with the terms of the sale
contract, since this damage is not considered normally foreseeable.” For an English translation in English
of the relevant excerpts see Dionysios Flambouras, Editorial Remarks to Judgment 4505/2009, § 2.2.11,
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/094505gr.html.186 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:171
(4) Seller’s Action: Buyer’s Allegation (Objection) Regarding Lack of
Conformity of the Bullet-Proof Material to the Requirements of the Bullet-
Proof Material Sale Contract
(i) Buyer’s Allegation
17. The Buyer alleged that the Seller “at the time the risk was transferred
did not comply with the terms of the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract,
37
since on 20.9.2002, during the process of ballistic tests for the Bullet-Proof
Vest and of the taking of delivery,  the committee of quality assurance
38
verified that the Bullet-Proof Vests presented penetration during the ballistic
tests and therefore the action (of the Seller) should be rejected.”
39
(ii) Court’s Judgment Confirming That the Buyer’s Allegation on Lack
of Conformity Was an “Objection” (Enstasi)
18. The Court rightly judged that the above allegation of the defendant
(Buyer)  constituted an objection (“enstasi”) based on articles 36 § 1, 38 § 1,
40
39, 60 case (b) and 67–69 CISG and therefore it was the Buyer who should
prove the legal and substantial grounds of this allegation. The Court based its
conclusion on the fact that after the Buyer took delivery of the ten earlier
quantities of the Bullet-Proof Material,  it did not conduct any examination
41
on these received quantities within as short a period as is practicable in the
circumstances  neither did it (the Buyer) notified the lack of conformity to the
42
Seller within a reasonable period of time.  That is why (i.e. due to the non-
43
compliance with the above duties) the Buyer was unable to reverse the burden
of proof in order for the Seller to be the one who should then prove that, at the
time the risk was transferred, the Bullet-Proof Material was in conformity to
the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract.  The fact that the Court cited the
44
37. See supra ¶ 4.
38. See supra ¶ 7.
39. Judgment 4505/2009 at 36.
40. See supra ¶ 17.
41. See supra ¶ 6.
42. See CISG art. 38, § 1.
43. See CISG art. 29, § 1.
44. Judgment 4505/2009 at 36 (summarised the law as follows: “Once the Buyer takes delivery of
the goods (CISG art. 60 case (b)), if any question is risen for the lack of conformity thereof, it bears the
obligation to prove that the goods do not conform with the contract at the time the risk was transferred2011] WHEN BULLETS PENETRATE BULLET-PROOF VESTS 187
relevant CISG provisions leads to the conclusion that it followed the opinion
pursuant to which the burden of proof relating to non-conformity of the goods
with the contract of sale is a matter falling within the scope of the CISG.  
45
(CISG art. 36, §§ 1 and 67–69). Nevertheless, if the Buyer, after taking delivery of the goods, examines
them within as short a period as is practicable in the circumstances (CISG art. 38, § 1), and discovers the
lack of conformity, and notifies the said lack of conformity to the Seller within a reasonable period of time
determining the exact nature thereof (CISG art. 39), for which it certainly bears the burden of proof, then
the burden of the proof is reversed and the Seller is obliged to prove that at the time the risk was transferred
the goods were in conformity with the contract.”). See Rechtbank [District Court of Breda] Netherlands,
16 Jan. 2009, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090116nl.html; Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Power
Source Supply, Inc., 2008 WL 2884102 (W.D. Pa. 2008), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
080725ul.html; Landgericht [District Court of Bamberg] Germany, 23 Oct. 2006, available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/061023g1.html; Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408
F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050523u1.html (“under the
CISG, the buyer-defendant bears the burden of proving non-conformity at the time of transfer (i.e. of
risk)”); Bundesgericht [Supreme Court] Switzerland, 7 July 2004, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/040707s1.html; Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Supreme Court] Germany, 9 Jan. 2002, available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/00109g1.html.  See  also  Anastássios  Valtoudis,  On  the  problem  of
concurrence of liability for real defects pursuant to the Vienna Convention (CISG) with the national non-
contractual law, ARMENOPOULOS (Áñì) 337 (1999). But see SCHWENZER, supra note 35, at 592–94 (this
Author initially states that “once the buyer has physically taken over the goods, he generally has to prove
their non-conformity at the time of passing of risk [and . . .] if the buyer rejects the goods or notifies the
seller of their non-conformity immediately at the time of taking over, the seller has to prove that the goods
were in conformity with the contract”; however, then she goes on by stating that “[T]he further reaching
approach of imposing the burden of proof on the seller in all cases in which the buyer gives timely notice
of non-conformity pursuant to Article 39, has to be rejected”). On the burden of proof under CISG art. 35,
see Anna Linne, Burden of Proof Under Article 35 CISG, 20 PACE INT’L L. REV. 31 (2008).
45. See Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Supreme Court] Germany, 9 Jan. 2002, available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/00109g1.html (“the burden of proof is a matter governed by the CISG expressly
(CISG 79, § 1) or impliedly (CISG 2 case a)”); Chicago Prime Packers, 408 F.3d at 898. Furthermore it
is suggested that the CISG includes a general principle (applicable by virtue of CISG art. 7, § 2) on the basis
of which each contracting party has the burden to prove the facts that support its right, its claim or a
possible objection, that is any facts to its benefit. See P. Huber, Some Introductory Remarks on the CISG,
INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT 228, 234 (2006); P. Kornilakis, A Dogmatic Approach to the New
Provisions—The Concept of Fundamental Contractual Breach, NORTHERN GREECE LAW UNION (ENOBE)
14 (2001); P. Arvanitakis, The Effect of the Vienna Convention for the International Sale of Goods to the
Procedural Law, CHRONICLES OF PRIVATE LAW (×ñÉÄ) 673, 682 (2001). See also Bundesgericht [Supreme
Court] Switzerland, 7 July 2004, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040707s1.html (“The
allocation of the burden of proof between the parties is regulated by the CISG. In case an explicit rule is not
available, a court has to resort to the general principles underlying the Convention. As one of these
principles, it must be taken into account how close each party is to the relevant facts at issue, i.e., a party’s
ability to gather and submit evidence for that point. Hence, if a buyer takes on a delivery without giving
notice for any claimed deficiencies, thus establishing its exclusive possession of the goods, then it, the
buyer, has to prove any claimed lack of conformity of the delivered goods”); SCHWENZER, supra note 35,
at 592 (“The allocation of the burden of proof follows from the principle of ‘the rule and exception’ and
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(iii) Court’s Judgment Confirming That One Month Is Considered a
Reasonable Period for the Notification of the Lack of Conformity in the
Context of Article 39, § 1 CISG
19. We consider that above judgement of the Court  is correct. Indeed,
46
if the goods sold do not conform to the sale contract during the time the risk
was transferred,  then the Buyer is obliged to examine the goods within as
47
short a period as is practicable in the circumstances and notify the said lack
of conformity to the Seller within a reasonable period of time, otherwise the
Buyer is deprived of the ability to exercise the legal remedies provided for the
lack of conformity under articles 38 and 39 CISG  subject of course to the
48
exception set out in CISG article 40.  The Court, consistent with the findings
49
of a substantial part of foreign case law, considered the period of one (1)
month as a reasonable period for the notification of the lack of conformity for
the purposes of article 39 CISG.  It should be noted though that the Court
50
46. See supra ¶ 18.
47. See infra ¶ 28.
48. Judgment 4505/2009 at 36 (summarised the law as follows: “Legal remedies of the Buyer for
the non-conformity of the goods to the contract’s requirements (CISG 35), may be exercised, only if the
Buyer has observed the obligations provided for by the CISG, i.e., (a) examination of the goods within as
short a period as is practicable in the circumstances (CISG 38, § 1); and (b) notification of the lack of
conformity to the Seller, with detailed description of the nature of the lack of conformity within a
“reasonable” period of time from the moment the Buyer discovered or ought to had discovered the lack of
conformity, which [reasonable period] is deemed that of one (1) month [. . .] and in any case within two
years from the date actual delivery of the goods was effected to the Buyer.”). Cf. Oberlandesgericht
[Appellate  Court  of  Linz]  Austria,  23  Jan.  2006,  available  at  http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
060123a3.html; Cour de Justice [Appellate Court of Geneva] Switzerland, 20 Jan. 2006, available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060120s1.html.
49. See supra ¶ 27.
50. In connection with the reasonableness of a time period for the purposes of CISG article 39, § 1.
See Tribunale [District Court of Forli] Italy, 11 Dec. 2008, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/081211i3.html (1 week); Oberlandesgericht [Appellate Court of Köln] Germany, 19 May 2008,
available  at  http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080519g1.html (5  months is  not  a  reasonable period);
Oberlandesgericht [Appellate Court of Hamburg] Germany, 25 Jan. 2008, available at http://cisgw3.law
.pace.edu/cases/080125g1.html (14 days-1 month); Regional Court of Zilina Slovak Republic, 25 Oct.
2007, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071025k1.html (3 months since the defect could only
be found if the sold cloth was worn); Landgericht [District Court of Bamberg] Germany, 23 Oct. 2006,
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/061023g1.html (1 month); Cour de Justice [Appellate Court
of Geneva] Switzerland, 20 Jan. 2006, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060120s1.html (1
month); Bundesgericht [Federal Court] Switzerland, 3 Nov. 2003, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
031113s1.html (1 month); Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Supreme Court] Germany, 8 Mar. 1995, available
at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950308g3.html (1 month); see also SCHWENZER, supra note 35, at
629–33 (with extensive references to case law and in particular “a period of approximately one month2011] WHEN BULLETS PENETRATE BULLET-PROOF VESTS 189
does not appear to adequately justify its conclusion that the Buyer “did not
conduct any examination of the quantities delivered within as short period as
is practicable in the circumstances” and therefore that it did not observe the
duty provided by article 38 CISG.  In particular, there is academic opinion
51
that as a rule, two periods must be distinguished, namely the period for
examining the goods and the period for giving notice of lack of conformity
and that these periods should not be combined to make a total period.  On this
52
basis  the  Court  should  had  specifically  considered  whether,  under  the
circumstances, the Buyer had examined the received Bullet-Proof Material in
the manner required under article 38 CISG. Recent case law however suggests
that prior examination within the context of article 38 CISG is not to be seen
as a requirement for an effective notice of non-conformity (within the context
of article 39 CISG) and thus, if the buyer gives timely notice of the lack of
conformity of the goods in the sense of article 39 § 1 CISG, it is irrelevant
whether  the  examination has taken place  within reasonable time  and in
reasonable form.
53
(iv) Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract: An Instalment Contract
20. In the case in question it is clear that certain particularities exist, since
the Seller was obliged to deliver the sold Bullet-Proof Material in instalments
(in  ten  “shipments”)  at  different  times;   furthermore,  each  delivery
54
(“shipment”) of Bullet-Proof Material was independent (severable) from the
other deliveries (“shipments”) and was independent (severable) in relation to
the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract as a whole. On this basis the Bullet-
Proof Material Sale Contract was an instalment contract.  It is worth noting
55
should at least be adopted as a rough average. In recent times the case law in Germany and Switzerland
would appear to be approaching this average.” Id. at 632. The 1 month period criterion has not been
followed though by many cases. Cf. Oberlandesgericht [Appellate Court of Schleswig] Germany, 22 Aug.
2002, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020822g2.html (in relation to livestock three or four
days or shorter under specific circumstances of the particular case); Sky Cast, Inc. v. Global Direct
Distribution, LLC, 2008 WL 754734 (E.D. Ky. 2008), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
080318u1.html (reasonable period of 10 months and in any event within the two year period of 39, § 2);
Monomeles Protodekeo [Single Member First Instance Court of Thessaloniki] Greece, 2003, available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030001gr.html (reasonable period of 2½ months).
51. Judgment 5450/2009.
52. SCHWENZER, supra note 35, at 629.
53. Landgericht München  [District  Court  of Munich]  Germany,  29  Nov. 2005,  available  at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/051129g1.html.
54. See supra ¶¶ 4, 6.
55. CISG art. 73. See CHRISTIANA FOUNTOULAKIS, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE190 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:171
that the Court referred only once, within the context of the Buyer’s Action
against the Seller, to the nature of the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract as
an instalment contract and the consequences related to this characteristic with
an emphasis on prescription issues.  In particular the Court, correctly in our
56
opinion, judged that the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract was an instalment
contract for the delivery of goods, since the instalments (“shipments”) of
Bullet-Proof Material were self-existent as compared among them.  It should
57
be noted that the above conclusion of the Court (i.e. that the Bullet-Proof
Material Sale Contract was an instalment contract), is further supported by the
fact that, until the discovery of the malfunction in the Seller’s Bullet-Proof
Material in September 2002, the Buyer had already used the Bullet-Proof
Material of the ten instalments (“shipments”) that the Seller had delivered to
it in order to manufacture Bullet-Proof Vests and the Buyer had already
delivered to the Ministry around 6,900 Bullet-Proof Vests.  By means of
58
commentary it is noted that the Court made no reference to the fact that the
instalments were self-existent not only as compared among them, but as
regards  the  Bullet-Proof  Material  Sale  Contract  as  a  whole,  as  it  is
accepted—in terms of interpretation—that should apply in the context of the
CISG in order for an instalment contract to exist.  Furthermore, it would be
59
preferable if the Court, for the purpose of categorising as instalment contract
the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract, had expressly referred to the criteria
of article 8 CISG (interpretation of the agreement in question and the parties’
statements) and not, as it did, to the views of domestic legal doctrine within
the context of interpretation of the Greek Civil Code; besides, this necessity
for recourse to article 8 CISG derives from article 7, § 1 CISG which calls for
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 986–87 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 3d ed.
2010) (“The question of whether the case involves an instalment contract or several unrelated contracts
depends on whether the transaction is to be regarded as a unit. In order to qualify as an instalment contract,
the sum of its subdivided unities must form a single whole. Factors indicating such a unit are a logical
and/or economic intertwinement of the deliveries; the contract appears to be unfinished or incomplete as
long as some deliveries are missing”). Cf. also ROSA HORNUNG, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION
ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 733 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds. 2d
ed. 2005) (“. . . at least two deliveries are required for such contract (i.e. instalment) to exist. The decisive
feature is the difference in time between the first and later deliveries, because that is why special remedies
are needed for this type of contract. Individual deliveries must be severable from each other and be
independent of the overall contract in such a way that they can be called instalments.”).
56. See infra ¶ 42.
57. Judgment 4505/2009 at 53.
58. See supra ¶ 11.
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independent interpretation of the Convention’s provisions without recourse to
domestic provisions and legal doctrine opinions on domestic law.
60
From  the  nature  of  the  Bullet-Proof  Material  Sale  Contract  as  an
instalment contract a basic question arises being what is the point of time
when the reasonable period of one month for the notification of the lack of
conformity commences,  if lack of conformity of the goods in an instalment
61
contract is discovered.
(v) Remedies Exercised by the Buyer in Connection with the Alleged
Lack of Conformity
21. In order to respond to the above question  it has to be examined
62
which legal remedy was exercised by the Buyer for the lack of conformity
with the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract of the quantity of the Bullet-
Proof Material sold and which part (parts) instalment(s) of the quantity
concerned the exercise of the said legal remedy. From the actual facts as set
out in Judgment 4505/2009, it can be concluded at first, that the last date the
Buyer took delivery of the Bullet-Proof Material was 19.7.2002, while, during
the period from 11.1.2002 to 19.7.2002, the Seller delivered in ten instalments
(“shipments”)  to  the  Buyer,  a  quantity  of  Bullet-Proof  Material  which
amounted to a total of 125,129 lm.
63
Furthermore, from the text of Judgment 4505/2009 the following can be
concluded:
64
(i) The Buyer settled invoices corresponding to the first six instalments
(“shipments”)  and  paid  the  total  amount  of  €779,650  as  the
respective price.
(ii) The Buyer finally did not settle three invoices which corresponded
to three instalments (“shipments”) (No. 13196/30.5.2002 (shipment
No. 7), 13.439/19.7.2002 (shipment No. 9) and 13440/19.7.2002
(shipment No. 10)) which corresponded to a quantity of Bullet-Proof
Material of a total value €438,771.58.
60. See MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980
VIENNA SALES CONVENTION GIUFFRÉ, MILAN 72-73 (C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonell ed., 1987); Larry A.
DiMatteo et al., The Interpretative Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG
Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299, 311 (2004).
61. See CISG art. 39.
62. See supra ¶ 20.
63. See supra ¶ 6. See also Judgment 4525/2009 at 76.
64. See supra ¶¶ 6, 11, 12.192 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:171
Another issue is raised as to the legal grounds based on which the Buyer
refused  to  pay  the  unsettled  price.  In  particular,  in  a  facsimile  dated
18.3.2004  to the Seller, the Buyer repeated that the Authority rejected the
65
Bullet-Proof Material of the Seller due to penetration of a Bullet-Proof Vest
in the tests conducted on 20.9.2002  and that it demanded the repair of all
66
Bullet-Proof Vests that the Buyer delivered to it and, after the Buyer would
deduct the amount of €202,722 which corresponded to the cost for repairing
the Bullet-Proof Vests as requested by the Authority and set-off the advance
payment and the tests costs, it finally concluded that it owed to the Seller the
amount of €34,464.45, which it was willing to pay, but it never did so.
22. From the above facts the following could be suggested:
(a) One  possibility  is  that  the  Buyer  declared  avoided  the  three
instalments (“shipments”) of Bullet-Proof Material already delivered
to it (no. 7, 9 and 10) by refusing to pay the unsettled part of the
price corresponding to these instalments since, based on Buyer’s
allegations,  the  Bullet-Proof  Material  did  not  comply  with  the
contractual  description  under  the  Bullet-Proof  Material  Sale
Contract. Accordingly within the context of an instalment contract
the  Buyer  declared  three  delivered  instalments  avoided  due  to
fundamental breach  and its intention to declare the instalments
67
avoided was most probably evidenced by its behaviour (i.e. definite
refusal of the Buyer to pay the corresponding price, conclusion of a
contract on 27.10.2003 for the purchase of different bullet-proof
material from another supplier).    It needs to be noted though that
68 69
65. See supra ¶ 12.
66. See supra ¶ 7.
67. See CISG art. 73, § 1, 45, § 1(a), 25, 81.
68. See supra ¶ 11.
69. It is suggested that where the conduct of the party shows clearly the intention to terminate the
contract and where the conduct is communicated to the party in breach, this should suffice (being an
implicit declaration of avoidance) to effect avoidance of contract due to the general principle of freedom
of form enshrined in article 11 CISG. See Ulrich Magnus, The Remedy of Avoidance of Contract Under
CISG—General Remarks and Special Cases, 25 J.L. & COM. 423, 427 (2005); Christopher M. Jacobs,
Notice of Avoidance under the CISG: A Practical Examination of Substance and Form Considerations,
the Validity of Implicit Notice, and the Question of Revocability, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 407, 417 (2003) (“the
more clearly the given conduct suggests an intention to avoid, the more unnecessary it will be to require
formal notice”). However, the above opinion is strongly doubted since “the wording of Article 26 stems
from the rejection of the ipso facto avoidance.” Id. at 417; see FOUNTOULAKIS, supra note 55, at 442 (who
correctly states that avoidance of contract without declaration is of particular relevance with regard to the
calculation of damages under articles 75 or 76 CISG). See also Court of Arbitration of the International
Chamber  of  Commerce  No.  99788/1999,  Mar.  1999,  available  at  http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
999978i1.html. (It is, however, one of the major characteristics of the UN Sales Convention, when2011] WHEN BULLETS PENETRATE BULLET-PROOF VESTS 193
the Buyer’s subsequent behaviour appeared rather contradictory in
relation to its intention to avoid these three instalments since, within
the context of the Seller’s Action proceedings, the Buyer denied to
pay the amounts claimed by the Seller (including the price for these
three instalments) by suggesting set-off, i.e. by alleging that it had
against the Seller due and payable counter-claims of the same kind
(i.e.  monetary)  arising,  inter  alia,  from  its  right  to  demand
compensation from the Seller.  Despite the above contradictory
70
behaviour of the Buyer which leaves a degree of uncertainty as to
whether the Buyer had declared instalments no. 7, 9 and 10 avoided
or not the examination of the Buyer’s entitlement to declare these
instalments  avoided  raises  important  legal  questions  and  grants
incentive for interesting commentary.
On this basis, the Buyer would not be entitled to declare instalments
no. 7, 9 and 10 avoided for various reasons. Firstly, as the Court
accepted, the delivered quantities of Bullet-Proof Material were in
conformity  with  the  Bullet-Proof  Material  Sale  Contract  and
therefore  there  was  no  fundamental  breach  of  contract  by  the
Seller.  Secondly, even if it was assumed that there was fundamental
71
breach due to the non-conformity of the Bullet-Proof Material, the
Buyer could had lost its right to declare instalments no. 7, 9 and 10
avoided since it was impossible for it to make restitution of the
Bullet-Proof Material in the condition in which it received it (i.e. the
quantities of the Bullet-Proof Material delivered as instalments 7, 9
and 10 had been transformed because they had been used as raw
material for the manufacture of Bullet-Proof Vests under the Bullet-
Proof  Vests  Manufacturing  Contract  and  then  delivered  to  the
Authority  under  the  Bullet-Proof  Vests  Supply  Contract).  
72 73
compared to its predecessors, the Hague Sales Convention of 1964, that international sales contracts are
not invalidated ex lege but only in case of a clear and unambiguous declaration of avoidance by one of the
parties pursuant to Art. 26 CISG. For this reason a notice of avoidance under Art. 26 CISG must satisfy a
high standard of clarity and precision [ . . . ] however, Claimant has made it clear to Respondent that it
demands repayment of the amounts paid under the L/C. This declaration satisfies the strict standard to be
applied under Art. 26 CISG. It does not matter that Claimant did not use the technical terms “avoidance”
or “avoid.” Declarations of avoidance under Art. 26 CISG may be made implicitly, provided that it is made
clear to the other party that the party entitled to avoidance does not intend to stand by the contract any
more.)
70. See infra ¶ 30.
71. See infra ¶ 48.
72. CISG art. 82, § 1.
73. The consequences when one instalment or more under an instalment contract is (are) declared194 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:171
Thirdly, the Buyer had not complied with its duties under articles 38
and 39 CISG,  and fourthly, the Buyer most probably would had not
74
complied with the requirement set out in article 49, § 2(b) CISG for
timely  declaration  of  avoidance  which,  by  means  of  a  general
principle,  also applies in connection with the avoidance of one or
75
more instalments under an instalment contract.  Accordingly, since
76
the Buyer was not entitled to declare instalments no. 7, 9 and 10
avoided, it (the Buyer) continued (as accepted by the Court)  owing
77
the price corresponded to these instalments under the Bullet-Proof
Material Sale Contract.  Finally it could alternatively be suggested
78
that the Buyer, based on a general principle (article 7, § 2) deriving
from articles 58, 71, 81 § 2, 85(b) and 86 § 1 CISG, exercised its
right to withhold (retain) performance;  on this basis the Buyer
79
withheld (retained), at least for some period of time, the performance
of its obligation to pay the price for the three instalments since,
avoided are regulated by articles 81 et seq. of the CISG. FOUNTOULAKIS, supra note 55, at 989. Harry M.
Flechtner, Remedies Under the New International Sales Convention: The Perspective from Article 2 of the
U.C.C., 8 J.L. & COM. 53, 89 (1988) (“The purpose of Article 73(1) . . . is to permit a party to treat each
installment of an installment contract as a severable contract for the purposes of avoidance.”). However,
in this case the Buyer would retain all other remedies under the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract and the
CISG. See CISG art. 83. Furthermore, the Buyer could invoke article 82, § 3 CISG in order to preserve its
right to declare instalments no. 7, 9 and 10 avoided, claiming that it transformed the Bullet-Proof Material
into Bullet-Proof Vests in the course of normal use (i.e. bullet-proof material is normally used as raw
material for bullet-proof clothing) and then the Bullet-Proof Vests were sold in the normal course of
business, before it (the Buyer) discovered or ought to have discovered the lack of conformity thereof with
the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract; in this latter instance though the Buyer would still be obliged to
account to the Seller for all benefits which it had derived from the Bullet-Proof Material. See CISG art. 84,
§ 2(a). However, such benefits should be net benefits and be retained by the Buyer (e.g., any money
received from a sub-buyer does not account as a benefit under the head contract of sale if it has to be
returned to the sub-buyer following rejection of the goods, since article 84 CISG concerns only retained
benefits). See Michael Bridge, The Nature and Consequences of Avoidance of the Contract Under the UN
Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 10 INT’L L. REV. WUHAN U. 118, 128 (2009).
74. See infra ¶ 23.
75. CISG art. 7, § 2.
76. See infra ¶ 24.
77. See infra ¶ 31.
78. If the contract is not legally declared avoided the parties continue to be obliged to perform their
contractual obligations. For the effects of the declaration of the contract avoided in accordance with the law
under the CISG, see CISG arts. 81–84 and analytically cf. CISG-AC Opinion No. 9, Consequences of
Avoidance of the Contract, Rapporteur: Professor Michael Bridge, London School of Economics, London,
U.K., Adopted by the CISG-AC in its 12th meeting in Tokyo, Japan on 15.11.2008. Bridge, supra note 73,
at 118–28.
79. On this general principle, see SCHWENZER, supra note 35, at 141.2011] WHEN BULLETS PENETRATE BULLET-PROOF VESTS 195
based on its allegations, the Bullet-Proof Material did not conform
to the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract.
80
(b) The Buyer, by means of a facsimile dated 11.2.2003, refused to take
delivery, as it was obliged,  of the remaining 29,871 lm of Bullet-
81
Proof  Material  (i.e.  the  11th  instalment-shipment)  that  worth
€290,856.22,  requesting  the  Seller  to  “dispose  them  otherwise”
claiming that “they were not truly necessary for the performance of
the order contract and that they were ordered (by the Buyer) only in
order to reduce the time of the production process.”  By its above
82
statement, it appears that the Buyer attempted to declare the 11th
instalment of 29,872 lm  avoided after the lapse of the period in
83
which it was obliged to take delivery thereof. Accordingly within the
context of an instalment contract the Buyer declared one instalment
avoided.   However,  the  Buyer  was  not  entitled  to  declare  the
84
specific instalment avoided, since it did not invoke a fundamental
80. On the right of a buyer to withhold (retain) performance of its obligation to pay the purchase
price due to non-conformity of the goods, see Oberster Gerichtshof [Supreme Court] Austria, 8 Nov. 2005,
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/051108a2.html.
81. In order to legally support this conclusion in Judgment 4505/2009 at 11 the following is stated:
The Buyer, on the other hand, bears the main contractual obligation to pay the price to the Seller at its
domicile, CISG art. 57, § 1 case (a), within the period set in the sale contract or concluded thereby and
which is once the goods or the supporting documents thereof are made available to it, CISG arts. 58, § 1,
59, and in contrast to the provisions of the Greek Civil Code (GCC), to take delivery of the good, CISG art.
60, a fact which also constitutes an important innovation of the Convention.
82. Judgment 4505/2009.
83. CISG arts. 53, 60. This, in our opinion, was a statement (within the meaning of CISG art. 26)
to declare instalment no. 11 avoided since it showed the Buyer’s intention to distance itself from this
instalment; this was the case even though the reason stated in this declaration did not actually constitute
a contractual breach. See FOUNTOULAKIS, supra note 55, at 440–41 (“courts and tribunals are often willing
to accept a certain conduct as an effective declaration of avoidance, as long as the party’s intention to
distance itself from the contract is made clear [. . .] the declaration need not mention the ground for
avoidance”); Magnus, supra note 69, at 427 (“Though the notice need not expressly mention the term
avoidance or termination it must make unambiguously clear that the contract is terminated.”); cf. Jacobs,
supra note 69, at 409 (“ the notice should certainly contain the reason for the declaration of avoidance”).
84. CISG arts. 73, § 1, 45, § 1(a), 25, 81. See also supra note 73. It should be noted that, even if the
time period for the acceptance of the 29,871 lm (for the 11th instalment) had not yet lapsed, the Buyer, in
view of the known to it penetration to the Bullet-Proof Vest during the tests conducted on 20.9.2002, see
supra ¶ 7, could, if there was a failure or a fundamental contractual breach in connection with instalments
no. 7, 9 and 10, see CISG art. 25, have declared the contract avoided in connection with future instalment
no. 11 under the conditions set out in article 73, § 2 CISG. See JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR
INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UN CONVENTION 443–44 (3d ed. 1999). However, article 73, § 2
CISG did not apply under the specific circumstances since, it is apparent from the facts, that the time at
which the Buyer was obliged to take delivery of the remaining quantity of Bullet-Proof Material had
elapsed. See FOUNTOULAKIS, supra note 55, at 992 (“the right to avoid the contract under Article 73(2) is
limited to future instalments”).196 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:171
contractual breach by the Seller as to this instalment  but (invoked)
85
a rather vague and “cryptic” excuse. In addition, as the Court judged,
the Bullet-Proof Material corresponded to the Bullet-Proof Material
Sale Contract and thus the Buyer had not breached the contract.  On
86
this basis the Buyer was still obliged, as the Court judged,  to take
87
delivery of the remaining 29,871 lm of Bullet-Proof Material (i.e. the
11th instalment-shipment)  and pay the respective price.
88 89
(c) Within the context of the Seller’s Action proceedings the Buyer
denied to pay all amounts claimed by the Seller  by suggesting set-
90
off, i.e. by alleging that it had against the Seller due and payable
counter-claims of the same kind (i.e. monetary) arising, inter alia,
from expenses equal to €655,671.01 that the Buyer sustained since
the Ministry, due to the penetration of the Bullet-Proof Vest at the
ballistic  tests  of  20.9.2002,   refused  to  take  delivery  of  the
91
remaining units of Bullet-Proof Vests and demanded, under the
Bullet-Proof Vests Supply Contract, from the Buyer to repair the
delivered Bullet-Proof Vests with the addition of improving material
(aramidic/Kevlar).   Accordingly  the  Buyer  raised  a  claim  for
92
compensation of damages suffered due to lack of conformity of the
Bullet-Proof  Material  delivered  to  it  in  instalments  under  an
instalment contract.  It is noted that the Court, within the context of
93
the Seller’s Claim, adjudicated only in relation to one counter-claim
of the Buyer under the set-off objection,  since most of the Buyer’s
94
counter-claims were also part of the Buyer’s Action against the
Seller  where  the relevant  compensation  claim of  the Buyer  is
95
analysed).
85. CISG arts. 73, § 1, 45, § 1(a), 25.
86. See infra ¶ 48.
87. See infra ¶ 31.
88. CISG arts. 53, 60.
89. See supra note 80.
90. See supra ¶ 13.
91. See supra ¶ 7.
92. See supra ¶ 12.
93. See CISG arts. 73, § 1, 45, § 1(b), 74, 77.
94. See infra ¶ 30.
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(vi)  Time  of  Commencement  of  the  Reasonable  Period  for  the
Notification by the Buyer of the Lack of Conformity
23. As regards the time at which the Buyer notified the lack of conformity
to the Seller, the following are concluded: in a meeting held in Athens on
25.9.2002 (i.e. about 8 months after the first delivery of Bullet-Proof Material
(11.1.2002) and 1 month and 6 days after the last delivery of the Bullet-Proof
Material (19.7.2002)), the Buyer (and the State Weapon Co.) informed the
Seller for the first time (whereas on 9.10.2002 a letter from the State Weapon
Co. followed) as to the failure (penetration of the Bullet-Proof Vest) which
occurred  in  the  ballistic  tests  held  on  20.9.2002  (these  were  the  tests
conducted for the acceptance of the end product, i.e. the Bullet-Proof Vests
manufactured by the Bullet-Proof Material).    Therefore, with reference to
96 97
each of instalments no. 7, 9 and 10 for the delivery of Bullet-Proof Material,
if one accepts that the Buyer tried to declare them avoided,  the latter notified
98
the lack of conformity to the Seller, one month and six days after taking
delivery of instalments no. 9 and 10 (it took delivery thereof on 19.7.2002)
and 3 months and 29 days as regards instalment no. 7 (it took delivery thereof
on 30.5.2002) which time periods would be further extended if it was found
that the notification was effected by means of the letter of the State Weapon
Co. on 9.10.2002.
99
Consequently, based on the criterion of “one month” adopted by the
Court,   the  Buyer  had  not  notified  the  lack  of  conformity  as  regards
100
instalments no. 7, 9 and 10 within a reasonable period of time as stipulated by
article 39 CISG and this resulted to the following:
(a) The burden of proof was not reversed and the Buyer was still obliged
to prove that at the time the risk was transferred the goods were in
conformity with the contract.
101
(b) Even  if  at  the  time  the  risk  was  transferred  there  was  lack  of
conformity (which was not though the case)  of the quantities
102
96. See supra ¶ 7.
97. Judgment 4505/2009 at 78.
98. See supra ¶ 22(a).
99. The requirements for a proper examination of the goods and a notice for their non-conformity
pursuant to articles 38 and 39 CISG must be observed with regards to any instalment to be avoided.
FOUNTOULAKIS, supra note 55, at 989.
100. See supra ¶ 9.
101. See supra ¶ 18, see infra ¶ 28.
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(instalments) of Bullet-Proof Material no. 7, 9 and 10 that the Buyer
had taken delivery of in accordance with the Bullet-Proof Material
Sale Contract, again the latter would not be entitled to declare them
avoided  or demand compensation for the damage it suffered due
103
to the non-conformity of the Bullet-Proof Material with the Bullet-
Proof Material Sale contract.
104
(vii) Limitations Regarding Avoidance?
24. Furthermore it needs to be noted that even if it could be presumed that
the notification for the lack of conformity was served within a reasonable
period of time for the purposes of article 39 CISG, again it could be said that
the notification to the Seller of the fact that instalments no. 7, 9 and 10 were
declared avoided was not served within a reasonable time and therefore the
Buyer lost the right to declare them avoided. In particular it could be argued
that, when the Buyer declared these three instalments avoided, it violated a
general principle of the CISG,  the existence of which is concluded from
105
articles 49, § 2 and 64, § 2 CISG and according to which general principle,
subject to any agreement to the contrary between the parties,  a party who
106
is willing to declare avoided an instalment under an instalment contract
governed by the CISG, must do so within a reasonable period of time after it
knew or could have known its right of avoidance (i.e. the breach).
107
103. See supra ¶ 22(a).
104. See infra ¶ 34.
105. CISG art. 7, § 2.
106. CISG art. 6.
107. See FOUNTOULAKIS, supra note 55, at 988–89 (“an implicit time restriction for the exercise of
a right of avoidance is read into art. 26 and this time restriction applies also under art. 73, § 1”). In
particular what constitutes a “reasonable period of time” for the purposes of article 49, § 2(b) CISG must
be judged according to the circumstances of the particular case and the purpose of article 49, § 2(b)
including, among others, the length of the period for giving notice of defects under article 39, § 1 CISG,
the provisions of the contract, the type of goods and type of defect, as well as the behavior of the seller after
notice of defects has been given. See MARKUS MÜLLER-CHEN, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION
ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 762 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 3d
ed. 2010). For the above assessment on what constitutes a “reasonable period of time” one has also to take
into consideration whether the facts were complex and as a result detailed legal analysis and advice was
necessary in order for the counterparty of the breaching party to assess whether it will exercise avoidance
or the potential existence of bank holidays etc. See Oberlandesgeritcht [Appellate Court of Stuttgart]
Germany, 31 Mar. 2008, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080331g1.html. It is noted that if
the buyer cannot satisfy the requirement for timely declaration of the contract set out in article 49, § 2
CISG, it will not be able to avoid the contract (or the instalment(s) under an instalment contract) and will
be obliged to allow the seller to keep the price or to pay the price (offset in certain circumstances against
its (buyer’s) claim for damages). See also infra note 75.2011] WHEN BULLETS PENETRATE BULLET-PROOF VESTS 199
(viii) Article 35 CISG?
25. Within the context of the Buyer’s Action, the Buyer based its claim
against the Seller for pre-contractual liability. The Court rejected this claim
of the Buyer with a number of arguments. One argument was that the Seller
in the financial tender submitted to the State Weapon Co. on 14.2.2000 at the
pre-contractual stage, pointed out that the Bullet-Proof Material was a new
product in the market and did not exist for enough time in order to have real
experience data.  Another argument was  that  the Buyer  (and  the State
108
Weapon Co.) were obliged to be informed and could had been informed of the
fact that the Bullet-Proof Material “behaved” differently according to the
design and the bullet-proof vest; this was due to the fact that themselves had
extended experience and know-how and also had cooperated in the past (1994)
with the Seller and again had purchased the Seller’s bullet-proof material thus
being aware of its exact specifications.  The Court’s acceptance of the above
109
factual assumptions leads to the question whether “there was room left” for
the application of article 35, § 3 CISG and as a result whether the Buyer had
already lost its right to rely on lack of conformity (a question not examined by
the Court). In relation to this question the following should be noted: article
35, § 2 CISG relates only to cases of lack of conformity under article 35, § 2
CISG, not to contractually-agreed qualities of the goods under article 35, § 1
CISG. In this instance the Court made reference to both article 35, § 1 and 35,
§ 2 CISG in order to examine whether the Bullet-Proof Material conformed
to the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract.  On this basis the possibility that
110
article  35,  §  3  CISG  was  applicable  under  the  specific  facts  cannot  be
excluded especially since the Seller had revealed the potential issue at the pre-
contractual stage and the Buyer had experience and know-how on the bullet-
proof material market.
111
108. See supra ¶ 2, see infra ¶ 39(ii).
109. See infra ¶ 39(iii).
110. Judgment 4505/2009 at 14, 15, 93.
111. See SCHWENZER, supra note 35, at 586–87 (“Could not have been aware” denotes more than
gross negligence. Liability is only excluded for lack of conformity that is obvious [. . .] However, the buyer
has no obligation to examine the goods before the conclusion of the contract [. . .] The position will largely
depend on the circumstances of the particular case, such as the nature of the goods, the skill and experience
of each party, the reasonableness of an examination by the buyer, etc. If the seller combines the request to
examine the goods with a reference to possible defects in the goods, then, in any event, the buyer loses its
rights under Article 35(3) in respect of defects which would have been obvious upon such an examination,
even if it does not perform it.”). 200 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:171
26. Furthermore even if one accepts that the Court only applied article 35,
§ 1 CISG to examine the alleged lack of conformity the Buyer could still, on
the basis of the above facts, had lost its right to rely on the alleged lack of
conformity since, as it is suggested by legal doctrine, if the buyer knows from
the beginning that the goods cannot be brought into compliance with the
agreement under article 35, § 1 by the time of delivery, then any insistence on
such compliance constitutes venire contra factum proprium (i.e. breach of a
general principle of the article 7, § 2 CISG).  In addition it is suggested that
112
article 35, § 3 CISG applies by way of analogy to situations falling within the
scope of article 35, § 1 CISG.  Finally it has been judged within the context
113
of examining conformity of the goods to the contract under article 35, § 1
CISG that the buyer cannot complain about defects of which he either knew
or could not have been unaware since a buyer who buys goods, despite their
obvious defects, must be assumed to have accepted the goods as they are;
114
it is noted this last result can also be achieved also by virtue of article 7, § 1
and/or 6 CISG since, in our opinion, such interpretation of article 35, § 1
obviously observes (and promotes) good faith in international trade and, at the
same time, takes into consideration the buyers’ implied agreement without
recourse to article 35, § 3 CISG being necessary. Based on the above and the
factual assumptions of the Court  one cannot preclude that the Buyer could
115
be deemed to have accepted the Bullet-Proof Material and thus could not rely
on the alleged lack of conformity.
112. See INGEBORG SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 428 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d ed. 2005). It is suggested
that the principle of venire contra factum proprium stems from article 80 CISG. Kornilakis, supra note 45,
at 14 (This Author makes reference to a general principle pursuant to which the parties must show the
behaviour of a reasonable man, CISG arts. 8, § 2, 25, which also includes the prohibition of the abusive
exercise of rights and in particular the venire contra factum proprium principle.). See also Rolled Metal
Sheets Case (F.R.G. v. Austria) Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen
Wirtschaft-Wien SCH-4813 (Vienna Arbitral Tribunal 1994) (Austria) (showing the venire contra factum
proprium is definitely a principle governing the parties’ behaviour in international commercial transactions
which, although not expressly mentioned in the CISG, it stems from articles 29, § 2 and 16, § 2 CISG). 
113. See FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 147–48 (1992).
114. See René Franz Henschel, Conformity of Goods in International Sales Governed by CISG
Article 35: Caveat Venditor, Caveat Emptor and Contract Law as Background Law as a Competing Set
of Rules, 1 NORDIC J. COM. L. (2004) (referencing: (i) Vaud Cantonal [Appellate Court] Switzerland,
28 Oct. 1997; and (ii) Sion Cantonal [Appellate Court] Switzerland, 29 June 1998).
115. See supra ¶ 25.2011] WHEN BULLETS PENETRATE BULLET-PROOF VESTS 201
(ix) Article 40 CISG?
27.  Finally  it  would  be  preferable  if  the  Court,  in  the  interests  of
completeness, had also considered whether article 39 CISG was not applicable
in view of the possibility that the lack of conformity related to facts of which
the Seller knew or could not have been unaware and which it did not disclose
to the Buyer.  In particular, within the context of the Buyer’s Action, the
116
Seller raised an objection that the Buyer’s claim had already been prescribed.
In order to rebut the Seller’s objection on prescription, the Buyer raised a
counter-objection  and claimed that the Seller, being aware from its extended
117
experience and know-how at the time the risk was transferred to it, that the
Bullet-Proof Material failed in its antiballistic qualities with respect to the
type of the bullet-proof vest which would be used, although it was obliged to
notify to the Buyer the lack of agreed quality, it (the Seller) deliberately
withheld it in order to undertake the supply.  Furthermore it has to be noted
118
that the Buyer based its claim against the Seller for pre-contractual liability of
the latter on an argument similar to the above (i.e. that the Seller, although it
was aware from its extended experience and know-how that the “behaviour”
of the Bullet-Proof Material was differentiated according to the design of the
Bullet-Proof Vests, it deliberately omitted to notify this to the Buyer and the
State Weapon Co.); the Court however with a number of counter-arguments
rejected in its substance the claim of the Buyer.  On this basis it can be
119
suggested that even if the same or similar argument was suggested by the
Buyer within the context of article 40 CISG, the Court would most probably
had rejected the Buyer’s argument in its substance with similar arguments and
accordingly article 40 CISG would not apply under the specific facts.
120
116. See CISG art. 40. As a basic principle the buyer must, within the context of article 40 CISG,
prove that the seller knew of the facts relating to the lack of conformity or could not have been unaware of
them.  If  the  buyer  however  can  prove  the  lack  of  conformity  resulted  from  the  seller’s  sphere  of
responsibility, the burden of proof shifts onto the seller under consideration that it is closer to the facts: cf.
SCHWENZER, supra note 35, at 647.
117. See supra note 170.
118. See infra ¶ 42.
119. See infra ¶¶ 39(i–iii).
120. Furthermore it is apparent that article 40 CISG will only apply in exceptional circumstances. See
Oberster Gerichtshof [Supreme Court] Austria, 19 Dec. 2007, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/071219a3.html. See also Alejandro Garro, The Buyer’s “Safety Valve” Under Article 40: What Is
the Seller Supposed to Know and When?, 25 J.L. & COM. 253–60 (2005) (commenting on article 40 CISG).202 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:171
(x) The Point of the Transfer of Risk
28. From the text of Judgment 4505/2009 it is apparent that the Court did
not deal with the issue of the time when the risk was transferred and also that
there was no special clause in the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract that
regulated this issue, neither any clause according to which the Seller was
obliged to send the Bullet-Proof Material to the Buyer by means of a carrier.
Furthermore, it is obvious that the Bullet-Proof Material was not purchased
while being transported. Therefore, articles 67 and 68 CISG do not apply.
Nevertheless, it is stated in Judgment 4505/2009 that the Bullet-Proof Material
would be delivered by the Seller in Athens;  that is the Seller had undertaken
121
the transport of the Bullet-Proof Material to Athens and that the Bullet-Proof
Material Sale Contract had been concluded as a destination contract. On this
basis, it can be said that the Buyer was obliged to take delivery of the Bullet-
Proof Material at a place (in Athens) other than the place of business of the
Seller  (the  Netherlands).  Consequently,  the  risk  passed  to  the  Buyer  in
accordance with article 69, § 2 CISG (“when delivery is due and the buyer is
aware of the fact that the goods are placed at his disposal at that place”), i.e.
once the Seller would place the quantities of Bullet-Proof Material available
to the Buyer’s disposal in Athens and inform the Buyer as to this event (even
if the Buyer did not take over of the goods).
122
(xi) The Matter of the Burden of Proof
29. As said, if the Buyer had observed the duties of articles 38 and 39
CISG (i.e. if it had inspected the Bullet-Proof Material within as short period
as is practicable in the circumstances and had notified to the Seller the lack of
conformity of the Bullet-Proof Material with the Bullet-Proof Material Sale
Contract within a reasonable period of time),  then, pursuant to Judgment
123
4505/2009, it could have reversed the burden of proof and therefore the Seller
would then have the burden to prove that the Bullet-Proof Material was in
conformity with the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract at the time the risk
121. Judgment 4505/2009 at 30.
122. See GUNTER HAGER & MARTIN SCHMIDT-KESSEL, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 939 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 3d ed.
2010).
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was transferred, i.e. at the time the Bullet-Proof Material was made available
in Athens to the Buyer’s disposal.
124
(5) Seller’s Action: Buyer’s Objection Relating to Set-Off
30. The Buyer suggested for set-off, inter alia, its claim against the Seller
for the amount of €43,247.36 as part of the expenses (total being €655,671.01)
that the Buyer sustained in order to repair the delivered Bullet-Proof Vests and
replace the Bullet-Proof Material with aramidic (Kevlar) material following
request by the Authority.  The Court, rightly in our opinion, judged that
125
articles  440,  441  and  442  of  the  Greek  Civil  Code  applied,   since,  in
126
accordance with the article 7, § 2 CISG, there is an external gap in the CISG
as to the question of set-off, which cannot be regulated by a general principle
of the CISG and therefore it shall be regulated by the law to which the private
international law of the forum refers to; consequently, according to the rules
of the Greek private international law applicable at that time, Greek law was
the applicable law according to the express choice of the parties by means of
a relevant clause incorporated in the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract
127
and therefore the question of set-off was regulated by the provisions of the
Greek Civil Code.  Since most of the counter-claims suggested by the Buyer
128
for set-off (including remaining amounts on account of expenses for the repair
of the Bullet-Proof Vests) were also part of the Buyer’s Action against the
124. CISG art. 35, 36. See supra ¶¶ 18, 19, 28.
125. See supra ¶ 12.
126. Under Greek law the conditions for unilateral set-off are: (i) reciprocity of claims, Astikos
Kodikas [A.K.] [Civil Code] Article 440 (Greece) [hereinafter GCC]; (ii) claims must be of the same kind,
GCC art. 440; (iii) claims must be due, GCC art. 440; and (iv) set-off must be permitted, GCC arts. 450,
451. The extinction of reciprocal claims by set-off does not come about ipso jure, simply by the fulfilment
of the four conditions above. For the occurrence of the effects of extinction, it is required that set-off should
be  exercised  by  one  of  the  parties  by  declaration  to  the  other.  GCC  art.  441  ¶  1.  See  MICHAEL
STATHOPOULOS, CONTRACT LAW IN GREECE 161–62 (2d ed. 2009).
127. CISG arts. 3, § 1, 10. See supra ¶ 15.
128. Judgment 4505/2009 at 11. On the opinion that set-off is not within the scope of the CISG, see
Monomeles Protodikeio [Single Member Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki] Greece, 2008, available
at  http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080002gr.html  (Dionysios  Flambouras,  Editorial  Remarks);
Oberlandesgericht [Appellate Court of Köln] Germany, 19 May 2008, available at http://cisgw3.law
.pace.edu/cases/080519g1.html; Appellationsgericht [Appellate Court of Basel-Stadt] Switzerland, 26 Sept.
2008, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080926s1.html; Landgericht [First Instance Court of
Bamberg] Germany, 23 Oct. 2006, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/061023g1.html; Huber,
supra note 45, at 234. On the opinion that set-off is within the scope of the CISG, see SCHWENZER, supra
note 35, at 87 (These Authors support the minority opinion that is based on the rules in articles 81, § 2, 84,
§ 2 and 88, § 3 CISG the concept of set-off is generally encompassed by the CISG with regard to claims
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Seller which was filed by the Seller prior to the pleading of the set-off
objection, the Court suspended its judgment on these counter-claims until a
definite judgment on the Buyer’s Action was issued.
129
C. Sellers’ Action Was Accepted by the Court in Substance
(1)  Unsettled  Invoices  Corresponding  to  Instalments  No.  7,  9  and
10—Buyer’s Refusal to Take Delivery of the 11th Instalment and Refusal to
Pay the Price
31. The Court finally judged and accepted that the following were proved:
(i) Due to the contractual breach of the Buyer (since the Bullet-Proof
Material conformed to the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract)  the
130
Seller suffered positive damage (thetiki zimia) equal to €438,771.58,
i.e. the total of the unsettled invoices,  which were due with all
131
legal interest thereupon from the day following the day they were
agreed to be settled (due payment date).
(ii) The  Seller  suffered  loss  of  profit  (apothetiki  zimia)  equal  to
€290,856.22. This was due to fact that the Buyer was not entitled to
declare the 11th instalment (shipment) of 29.871 lm of Bullet-Proof
Material avoided,  since the Seller had fully met the requirements
132
of the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract (i.e. there was no lack of
conformity of the Bullet-Proof Material with the requirements of the
Bullet-Proof  Material  Sale  Contract  at  the  time  the  risk  was
transferred  and the actual reason for which the Buyer declared the
133
11th instalment avoided consisted in the fact that this quantity was
not actually necessary to it.  On this basis, since the Buyer was not
134
entitled to declare the 11th instalment avoided, no party was released
from its contractual obligations and the value (€290,856.22) of the
11th instalment of Bullet-Proof Material was due to the Seller, which
(quantity of Bullet-Proof Material) was duly prepared and offered by
the Seller, without however the Seller’s obligation being performed
due to the Buyer’s fault (who refused to take delivery of the last
129. See infra ¶ 33.
130. See infra ¶ 48.
131. See supra ¶¶ 11, 12, 13, 22(a).
132. See supra ¶¶ 9, 22(b).
133. CISG arts. 35, 36. See supra ¶ 28, see infra ¶ 48.
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quantity of  Bullet-Proof  Material). Consequently the amount  of
€290,856.22 was due with legal interest thereupon from the day
following the extrajudicial notice to the Buyer by the Seller which
was served on 26.9.2002.
Furthermore, the court adjudicated the Buyer to pay the above under (i) and
(ii) amounts with legal interest from the relevant dates.  The reference of the
135
text of Judgment 4505/2009 to “positive damage” and “loss of profit” leads
to the conclusion that the Court adjudicated the Seller the price corresponding
to instalments no. 7, 9 and 10 (of which the Buyer had taken delivery) and
instalment no. 11 (of which the Buyer did not take delivery), based on the
provisions for damages that is recovery of the loss that the Seller suffered due
to the fact that the Buyer breached its contractual obligation to pay the
price.  It is however suggested that payment of the price could also be legally
136
based only on articles 53, 61 and 62 CISG from which a relevant self-existent
claim for the payment of the agreed purchase price derives.
137
135. The Court supported this decision by stating that: “From CISG Article 78, it is concluded that
interest is due, without it being necessary to serve a notice upon the promisor and regardless of any damage
sustained by the promisee.” Judgement 4505/2009 (for the relevant part of the legal reasoning of Judgment
4505/2009 see Dionysios Flambouras, Editorial Remarks to Judgment 4505/2009, § 2.2.12, available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/094505gr.html; see also Polymeles Protodekeo [Multi Member First
Instance Court of Thessalonica] Greece, 2003, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030513gr.html
(Dionysios Flambouras, Editorial Remarks); Monomeles Protodekeo [Single Member First Instance Court
of Thessalonica] Greece, 2003, available at [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030001gr.html (Dionysios
Flambouras, Editorial Remarks).
136. See CISG arts. 61, 74, 77.
137. Under the CISG, the Seller can require the buyer to pay the purchase price and for such an action
the purchase price must be fixed or determinable and due. CISG arts. 28, 61, § 1(a), 62. See FLORIAN
MOHS, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 879 (Peter
Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 3d ed. 2010). In connection to instalments no. 7, 9 and 10
invoices had been issued and it was very clear that the Seller could request payment of the price since the
due dates had passed. Instalment no. 11, see supra ¶ 9, had been prepared and offered by the Seller to the
Buyer and since it conformed to the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract at the time of transfer of risk, the
Buyer, as  of the time that  instalment  no.  11  was  made available to  it,  was  obliged  to  pay  for  its
corresponding price. See CISG arts. 31, 58, § 1, 67, 69; Judgment 4505/2009, translated in Dionysios
Flambouras, Editorial Remarks to Judgment 4505/2009, § 2.2.13, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
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III. BUYER’S ACTION—LEGAL ISSUES AND SUBSTANCE—COURT’S
JUDGMENT—COMMENTARY
A. Buyer’s Action
32. The Buyer filed an action against the Seller and requested from the
latter to pay:
(i) The amount of €612,423.655 as positive loss (“thetiki zimia”) and
loss of profit (“apothetiki zimia”) which it suffered because the
Bullet-Proof Material that the Seller delivered to it (i.e. including the
six instalments that the Buyer had already purchased and for which
it had already paid the price)  was not in conformity as per quality
138
and kind with the requirements of the Bullet-Proof Material Sale
Contract, and thus the Ministry (1) refused to take delivery of the
remaining quantity of Bullet-Proof Vests that had been manufactured
by the specific Bullet-Proof Material (under the Bullet-Proof Vests
Manufacturing Contract); and (2) demanded from the Buyer to repair
the already delivered Bullet-Proof Vests (by replacing the Bullet-
Proof Material with aramidic material).
139
(ii) The amount of €8,151.08 which corresponded to the price for the
sale of 3,189 kg net weight of pieces of Bullet-Proof Material which
were  left  over  to  the  Buyer  from  the  processing  (i.e.  for  the
manufacturing  of  the  Bullet-Proof  Vests)  of  the  Bullet-Proof
Material that the Seller had dispatched, since the Seller had accepted
the  Buyer’s  offer  to  purchase  these  pieces  against  5  DM  or
€2.56/kgr.
140
(iii) The amount of €7,670.87 which corresponded to the Seller’s share
in the expenses of the ballistic tests that were conducted in the
ballistic centre of G. University in the U.K. (a claim assigned to the
Buyer by the State Weapon Co.).
141
(iv) The  amount  of  €300,000  as  compensation  for  moral  damages
sustained  by  the  Buyer  due  to  the  fact  that  its  reputation  was
damaged, since, by reason of the counter-contractual behaviour of
the  Seller,  the  Buyer’s  commercial  relations  with  its  main  and
138. See supra ¶ 6.
139. See supra ¶¶ 11, 12.
140. See infra ¶ 46.
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privileged clients, i.e. the Ministry and the Authority, were disturbed
and the validity and credibility of its goods to them were damaged.
142
As regards the above claims, the Buyer invoked the provisions on sale, pre-
contractual liability, tort and, as a subsidiary claim, unjustified enrichment.
B. Judgment of the Court on Buyer’s Action
(1) Applicable Provisions
33. The court judged that the Buyer’s action, to the part that was based
on the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract was legally grounded, based on
articles 1, § 1(a), 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 14, 15, 18, 23, 25, 30, 31, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 45,
53, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 66, 67, 74, 78, 99 and 100 CISG.
143
(2) Buyer’s Claim Based on CISG for Compensation Regarding Lack of
Conformity of Instalments
34. The compensation claim of the Buyer sought to recover the damage
that the Buyer suffered due to the lack of conformity of the Bullet-Proof
Material with the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract, including the quantities
of Bullet-Proof Material delivered under the six instalments which, as is
apparent, the Buyer had not declared avoided since it had already used the
delivered quantities under those six instalments in order to manufacture 6,900
Bullet-Proof Vests.  This compensation claim is indeed, as the Court judged,
144
based on articles 45 § 1(b) and 74–77 CISG since, in a sales contract with
instalments, as regards the case of breach of an instalment (or instalments),
apart from the fact that a party is entitled to declare such instalment(s) avoided
in case of a fundamental breach,  the non-breaching party is entitled, in
145
respect to such instalment(s), to all legal remedies in force for the sale contract
as a whole and consequently is entitled to the right to claim damages either
concurrently  with  avoidance  or  even  if  it  has  not  declared  the  contract
avoided.  The Court practically rejected on substantial grounds the Buyer’s
146
142. See infra ¶ 40.
143. The legal part of Judgment 4505/2009 includes numerous recitals of principles of law together
with extensive references to, mainly, Greek legal doctrine and case law. Judgment 4505/2009, translated
in Dionysios Flambouras, Editorial Remarks to Judgment 4505/2009, §§ 2.1–2.4.1, 3, available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/094505gr.html.
144. See supra ¶¶ 6, 11, 12.
145. CISG art. 73, § 1.
146. See supra note 73. Cf. FOUNTOULAKIS, supra note 55, at 985 (“Instead of avoiding the contract208 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:171
Action to the extent that it was legally based on the CISG provisions for
compensation.
147
(3) Monetary Claim of the Buyer Based on the Provisions on Tort and
Unjustified  Enrichment—Court’s  Judgment  on  Legal  Issues:  Concurrent
Remedies
35. In connection with its above claims the Buyer also invoked the
domestic Greek provisions on tort (adekopraxia)  and, as a subsidiary claim,
148
the provisions of unjustified enrichment (adekeologetos ploutesmos).  On
149
with regard to the defective statement, the creditor might wish to exercise other remedies available under
the CISG, such as the right to claim performance, substitute delivery, cure of the defect, a reduction of the
price or a right of suspension”). Furthermore even if the Buyer had declared these instalments avoided it
would still be entitled to also demand full damages for the Seller’s failure to perform with regard to all
losses (e.g. costs for removal of a non-conforming item or substitute sale, compensation for damages due
to delay and to ancillary and consequential losses). CISG arts. 45, § 2, 75, 76, 81, § 1. See MÜLLER-CHEN,
supra note 107, at 699–700 (This Author further states that in order for a buyer to be able to avoid the sale
contract (or one or more instalments under an instalment contract), the buyer is obliged to satisfy the
limitation set forth in article 49 CISG, particularly the timely declaration of the contract, see CISG art. 49,
§ 2 and see supra ¶ 24; if these preconditions have not been satisfied, the buyer is obliged to allow the seller
to keep the price or to pay the price (offset in certain circumstances against its (buyer’s) claim for
damages).).
147. See infra ¶ 48.
148. GCC art. 914. In Greece there is a general clause on tortious liability, it being article 914 GCC
which provides as follows: “A person who unlawfully and by its fault has caused prejudice to another shall
be liable for compensation.” On this basis if: (i) there is an act which is unlawful and due to fault (culpa)
(civil delict); (ii) such act is causing prejudice (injury, detriment, damage); and (iii) there is casual relation
between this act and the prejudice, then the party responsible is obliged to compensate. As regards
concurrence of contractual and tortious liability under Greek law the following should be noted: when the
act or omission which constitutes the contractual non-performance is simultaneously and itself unlawful
(i.e., it would also have been unlawful if it had been committed without the pre-existent contract),
concurrence of the two liabilities, tortious and contractual, is accepted. Only to the extent that the act of
non-performance of the obligation would not have been, without the pre-existent contract, unlawful, the
implementation of the tortious liability is precluded, by reason of the special nature of the provisions on
contractual liability (i.e. the injured party cannot choose between the provisions on contractual and those
on tortious liability depending on which best serve its interests) (French principe de ‘non-cumul’). See
STATHOPOULOS, supra note 126, at 42, 44, 45.
149. GCC art. 904. The institution of unjustified enrichment (adekeologetos ploutesmos) is regulated
by articles 904–913 GCC. art. 904, § 1 sub-paragraph 1 GCC provides “A person enriched without a lawful
cause from the patrimonium or to the detriment of another person is obliged to restitute the benefit.” On
this basis for the generation of unjustified enrichment the following conditions have to be met: (i) there
should be enrichment of a person, that is, of the debtor (who is obliged to return the enrichment); (ii) the
enrichment should have come about “from the patrimonium or to the detriment” of the creditor (who is
obliged to return the enrichment); (iii) the enrichment should be unjustified (“without just cause”) (i.e.
cause of the retention of the enrichment); and (iv) there should be a casual relation between the enrichment
of the debtor and the impoverishment of the creditor. The claim arising from unjustified enrichment stems2011] WHEN BULLETS PENETRATE BULLET-PROOF VESTS 209
this basis the Buyer brought into the picture the situation when a domestic law
provides legal consequences for the very same operative facts that invoke the
rules of the CISG, when the rule of domestic law bears label other than
“contract”; in this instance the question is whether such a domestic rule
remains in effect as an alternative to the provisions of the CISG (concurrent
remedy).  The Court, correctly in our opinion, rejected as non-legally based,
150
the grounds for the Buyer’s action for tort and unjustified enrichment, judging
that they do not concurrently apply with the provisions of the CISG since
otherwise there is a risk for non-uniform application of the CISG and therefore
the Buyer could only claim under the CISG compensation for the damages it
sustained.
151
36. The Court, in particular, held that if there is concurrent application of
domestic provisions for tort (non-contractual liability) with the provisions of
the CISG (contractual liability), the party that suffered damage (due to breach
of contract)] may claim compensation for its material damage only based on
the provisions  of  the CISG,  otherwise there is the risk for non-uniform
application of the CISG.  The question whether, in contracts governed by the
152
directly from the law (ex lege) and is self-existent as regards contractual obligations (which stem from
private autonomy), even though the enrichment was brought about by a contract and became unjust and
returnable afterwards because the contract, for example, was overturned. Furthermore, the prevailing view
in Greece suggests that the claim for unjust enrichment is subsidiary, which means that it is granted to the
claimant by the law only if it does not have any other claim for its satisfaction (however there is also
support for the view that, if the conditions of other provisions are fulfilled, there will be concurrence of
these provisions with that on unjust enrichment). See STATHOPOULOS, supra note 126, at 243–52.
150. HONNOLD, supra note 84, at 63–64.
151. See supra ¶ 32.
152. See Anastássios Valtoudis, To Próblema tes Sirroés tes Efthýnes jiá Pragmatiká Elattómata
Katá te Sýmbasi tes Wiénes (CISG) me to Ethnikó Exosymbatikó Díkaio [The Problem with Concurrent
Liability for Defects  pursuant  to  the Vienna  Convention  (CISG) compared  with  the domestic  non-
contractual law], ARMENOPOULOS: THESSALONIKI 327, 348 (1999); PANAYIOTIS KORNILAKIS, CONTRACT
LAW—PARTICULAR CONTRACTS 113; Georgios Nikolaides, The International Sale of Goods under the
CISG, THE INT’L SALE 64 (2000); Dionysios Flambouras, International Sales, INT’L TRANSACTIONS L.
682–83 (Pamboukis ed., 2009); Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, The CISG—Successes and Pitfalls,
57 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 470–71 (2009); INGEBORG SCHWENZER & PASCAL HACHEM, COMMENTARY ON
THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 100–01 (Peter Schlechtriem &
Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 3d ed. 2010) (These authors suggest the following distinction: if the property (i.e.
material) damage is the typical result of the breach of contract, i.e. the non-conformity of the goods, then
the CISG is considered to be exclusive, whereas if the property (material) damage is the result of the breach
of standard safety expectations then concurring claims under domestic law are admissible (since the CISG
is  not  concerned  with  general  duties  of  safety).).  Peter  Schlecthriem,  The  Borderland  of  Tort  and
Contract—Opening a New Frontier?, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 467 (1988) (If a domestic court law protects
the expectations of a buyer with regard to the quality of goods and thereby concurs with matters genuinely
governed by CISG, it is sufficient to adjust the ‘concurring’ tort action to the rules of CISG. It could not
be maintained, if the notice requirement was neglected [. . .] However, the injured parties could still sue in210 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:171
CISG, domestic law provisions on torts can apply concurrently with the CISG
is a matter of great controversy and as it is well known there is also strong
support for the opinion that such concurrent application is to a greater or
lesser extent possible.
153
tort in a forum having jurisdiction only for tort actions, for jurisdiction and venue are not matters governed
exclusively by CISG. The same would apply to other features of tort actions outside the scope of the CISG.);
HONNOLD, supra note 84, at 74, 76 (“Domestic rules that turn on substantially the same facts as the rule
of the Convention must be displaced by the Convention; any other result would destroy the Convention’s
basic function to establish uniform rules (Art. 7(1)). [ . . . ] Permitting recourse to domestic law can be
unfair since not all domestic systems permit choice between contract law (‘non-cumul’).”). See Electrocraft
Ark., Inc. v. Elec. Motors, Ltd et al., 2009 WL 5181854 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009), available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 091223u1.html (“[T]here is agreement that concurring state contractual claims
are preempted by the CISG [. . .] Thus, a tort that is in essence a contract claim and does not involve
interests existing independently of contractual obligations (such as goods that causing body injury) will fall
within the scope of the CISG regardless of the label given to the claim [. . .] and therefore not require a
determination concerning the preemptive effect of the CISG on tort remedies.); Forestal Guarani, S.A. v.
Daros Int’l, Inc., 2008 WL 4560701, (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2008), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/081007u1.html (“the CISG . . . preempts state contract law and common law, to the extent that those
causes of action fall within the scope of the CISG . . .”); Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 201
F. Supp. 2d 236, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020510u1.html (It
was held by the Court that the buyer’s negligence-based (domestic law) claims were preempted by the
CISG, whereas the buyer’s business tort claims for tortious interference with contract and business relations
were not.); see also Joseph Lookofsky, CISG Case Commentary on Preemption in Geneva Pharmaceuticals
and Stawski, PACE REV. CONVENTION  ON  CONT.  FOR  THE INT’L SALE  OF GOODS 115, 119 (2004);
Oberlandesgericht Thüringen [Court of Appeal of Thüringen] Germany, 26 May 1998, available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980526g1.html (“Lack of sufficient notice within the scope of the CISG
also extends to exclude other concurrent remedies, such as a claim for tortious liability.”).
153. Franco Ferrari, The Interaction Between the UN Conventions on Contracts for the International
Sale  of  Goods  and  Domestic  Remedies,  71  RABELS  ZEITSCHRIFT  FÜR  AUSLÄNDISCHES  UND
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 52, 75–76 (2007) (It is initially stated that “to the extent that the protected
interests overlap (as is the case where the purchased goods are damaged), the CISG applies exclusively and
trumps domestic law” but eventually suggested that “a tort action for property damages caused by defective
and non-conforming goods should not be barred by an omission to give notice within reasonable time under
Art.  39  CISG.”);  Joseph  Lookofsky,  In  Dubio  Pro  Conventione?  Some  Thoughts  About  Opt-Outs,
Computer Programs, and Preemption Under the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (CISG), 13 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 263, 286 (2003); Huber, supra note 45, at 233. As to case law supporting this view, see
Ceramica v. Mendelson Eng’g Technical Supply Ltd, Supreme Court, Israel, 17 Mar. 2009, available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090317i5.html (The Court allowed the buyer to make its claim in tort that
the seller was negligent in the manufacture of the tiles sold since, in the Court’s opinion, the interests which
the buyer was “struggling” to protect were not identical to the interest which the uniform law of the CISG
seeks to protect.). See Joseph Lookofsky, CISG Case Commentary on Concurrent Remedies in Pamesa v.
Mendelson,  PACE  L.  SCH.  INST.  INT’L  COM.  L.  (2010),  available  at  http://ww.cisg.law.pace.edu/
cisg/biblio/lookofsky19.html); Shane v. JCB Belgium N.V., [2003] Superior Court of Justice, available
at  http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/031114c4.html  (Can.)  (“The  plaintiffs  are  claiming  damages  for
negligent manufacture and design of the tractor [. . .] The law which the parties agree applies [to the
contract] is the CISG [. . . ] A greater factor is the law where the tort occurred should be applied for claims
in negligence”); Viva Vino Imp. Corp. v. Farnese Vini, 2000 WL 1224903 (E.D. Pa. 2000), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000829u1.html (“The CISG does not apply to tort claims. Consequently,2011] WHEN BULLETS PENETRATE BULLET-PROOF VESTS 211
37. Furthermore the Court held that if the provisions of the CISG apply
concurrently with the domestic provisions on unjustified enrichment the
application of the domestic provisions is excluded since, on the one hand, the
provision of article 84, § 2 CISG is the basis for the relevant general principle
of the Vienna Convention which orders the return of the enrichment received
in case the sales contract is declared avoided at a later time,  and on the other
154
hand, the provision of article 81, § 2(a) CISG provides that after the exercise
of a party’s remedy to declare the contract avoided, there is an obligation by
law (ex lege) for the return (restitution) of the obligations that have been
performed.  The opposite opinion is however also supported, i.e. that, as
155
it is inapplicable to plaintiff’s claim of tortious interference with business relations.”); Roder v. Rosedown
(1995), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950428a2.html (Austl.) (A claim against the buyer
and the administer based on “the tort of conversion for interfering with the possessory rights of [seller]” was
regarded as outside the scope of the CISG and ruled on by the Court under domestic law.). Beijing Metals
& Minerals Import/Export Co. v. American Business Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d 1178, 1183 n.9 (5th Cir. 1993),
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930615u1.html (The Court referred solely to Texas law in
its evaluation of allegations of actionable fraud and economic duress.).
154. See Robert Hilman, Applying the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: The Elusive Goal of Uniformity, CORNELL REV. CONVENTION FOR THE INT’L SALE OF GOODS 21,
35–37 (1995), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/hillman1.html; SCHWENZER, supra
note 35, at 139 (“Article 84 is understood to establish a general principle requiring restitution of unjustified
enrichments gained by a failed sales transaction”).
155. See Nikolaides, supra note 152, at 136; GEORGIOS NIKOLAIDES, SPHERE OF APPLICATION OF THE
VIENNA CONVENTION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 258 (2001). Flambouras, supra note 152,
§ 684; FOUNTOULAKIS, supra note 55, at 1103 (“The decisive question is whether the rules of restitution
of the CISG can be supplemented or even replaced by national restitutionary law. The answer is clearly in
the negative. The most obvious reason for this can be found in Article 7(1), viz, in the requirement to
promote uniformity when applying the CISG [. . .] the whole liquidation of the contract is subjected to a
uniform, autonomously regulated regime that grants (only) contractual claims for restitution. The need for
a uniform application of the CISG is only satisfied if domestic laws—be it legal provisions on contract,
unjust  enrichment,  or  property  rights—are  excluded.);  CISG-AC  Opinion  No.  9,  Consequences  of
Avoidance of the Contract, Rapporteur: Professor Michael Bridge, LSE, London, U.K., Adopted by the
CISG-AC in its 12th meeting in Tokyo, Japan on 15.11.2008, Opinion 1.5, Comment 3.8 et seq.; Magnus,
supra note 69, at 431; Henry Deeb Gabriel, The Buyer’s Performance Under the CISG: Articles 53–60
Trends in the Decisions, 25 J.L. & COM. 273, 279 (2005) (“Since the CISG governs questions of avoidance
and restitution, an agreement otherwise governed by the CISG would appear to require that the initial
inquiry should be based on the rules and principles of the CISG. Only if it is determined that the CISG does
not answer the question should one fall back on other law.”). On case law supporting this view, see 1999
Int’l Comm. Arb. No. 9978, available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=471&step
=FullText (“In the oral hearing, Respondent has argued that it is relieved from refunding the purchase price
to Claimant because the monies received from Claimant are no longer in Respondent’s possession. This
view, however, misinterprets the true nature of the restitution system established in Art. 81 et seq. CISG.
This system does not establish a condictio indebiti in the proper sense. For this reason, a reference to the
rules of unjust enrichment of the applicable domestic law is neither necessary nor permissible [. . .]
[R]ather,  the  system  is  based  on  the  Roman  law  model  of  actio  quanti  minoris.”);  Handelsgericht
[Commercial Court of Zürich] Switzerland, 5 Feb. 1997, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/212 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:171
regards contracts governed by the CISG, domestic provisions on unjustified
enrichment can apply concurrently with the CISG.
156
970205s1.html (“Upon contract avoidance and a thereby following duty of the seller is to refund the
purchase price received beforehand or parts thereof, the seller has to pay interest on it from the date on
which the price was paid (CISG Art. 84(1)”). 
156. Ana M. López Rodríguez, The Effects of Avoidance on Obligations: The Modes of Restitution
under the 1980 U.N. Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 9 VINDOBONA J. COM. L. & ARB. 291,
298 (2005) (“[A] cautious approach would refer this matter to the applicable domestic law.”). On case law
supporting this view, see Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, 2006 WL
2924779 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2006), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/061010u1.html (In a
proceeding governed by the CISG, the Court cites U.S. domestic law in support of the proposition that
“there is conflicting authority in this district as to whether a plaintiff may plead unjust enrichment as an
alternative theory of recovery” and, also citing U.S. domestic case law, concludes that “a plaintiff may set
forth both causes of action as alternative theories, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(2). United States v.
Boeing Co., 184 F.R.D. 107, 112 (S.D. Ohio 1998).”); Bundesgericht [Supreme Court] Switzerland, 7 July
2004, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040707s1.html (“Claims [for unjust enrichment] do
not fall within the scope of the CISG . . . The applicable provisions of international private law define which
national law shall govern [claims] for undue enrichment.”). Oberster Cerichtshof [Supreme Court] Austria,
10 Mar. 1998, available at http:cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980310a3.html (“According to § 46(2) of the
Austrian Statute regulating the Conflict of Private Laws as the private law provision of the forum, claims
for restitution due to avoidance of contract are governed by the national law which is applicable to the
contract itself [. . .] As the applicable CISG does not provide for restitutionary matters of the kind at issue,
the claim is governed by Swiss law . . .”). Cour d’appel [Appellate Court of Paris] France, 14 Jan. 1998,
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980114f1.html (The Court considered, pursuant to art. 7
CISG, whether the question of the place of restitution of the price by the seller following cancellation of the
sale could be settled in accordance with the general principles); Oberlandesgericht [Appellate Court of Linz]
Austria, 8 Sept. 1997, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970908a3.html (With respect to the
restitution of the deposit in question, the Court clarified that the restitution of a deposit is an obligation
arising from an unjustified enrichment, which is a matter not covered by CISG.); 1990 Int’l Comm. Arb.
No. 6149, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/906149i1.html (“There are no provisions in the
Vienna Convention covering claims for the restitution of an unjust enrichment or the limitation of claims.
In order to be able to decide on these issues, the arbitral tribunal therefore would have to recur to the
determination, by another rule of conflict of laws, of a national law as the proper law of contract and the
arbitral tribunal would have to apply insofar such national law to the subject-matter of the present
arbitration.”); Adras Chmorey Binyan v. Harlow & Jones GmbH, Supreme Court, Israel, 2 Nov. 1999,
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/881102i5.html (editorial remarks by Arie Reich, Daniel
Friedman). See also Peter Schlecthriem, Uniform Sales Law—The Experience with Uniform Sales Law in
the Federal Republic of Germany, 3 JURIDISK TIDSKRIFT 1, 12–13 (1991) (summarizing as follows: “An
Israeli buyer had bought steel from a German seller. The contract was improperly performed. The buyer,
however, had lost its remedies under ULIS by lapse of time and lack of notice, and it had lost a litigation
in which the courts up to the Israeli Supreme Court applied the Hague Uniform Sales Law. Then the [buyer]
started a new litigation saying in nuce that the German seller, by not performing the contract and not being
liable under ULIS, was unjustly enriched. The buyer succeeded in claiming benefits which the German
party allegedly had derived from not performing the contract under unjust enrichment rules. In this instance,
the rules of the Convention and its requirement for certain remedies were pushed aside by a restitutionary
remedy under domestic law.”).2011] WHEN BULLETS PENETRATE BULLET-PROOF VESTS 213
(4) Buyer’s Action: Buyer’s Claim Based on Provision for Pre-Contractual
Liability (Liability Under the Negotiations)—Court’s Judgment on Legal
Issues and Substance
38.  Greek  law  imposes  certain  duties  on  parties  who  enter  into
negotiations, even before the action contract is concluded.  The Buyer
157
invoked  pre-contractual  liability  of  the  Seller.  As  is  it  known,  if  the
negotiations lead to a contract of sale that is governed by the CISG, the
question will arise of whether domestic law provisions on pre-contractual
liability can be invoked by the injured party or whether this is excluded by the
CISG.  In connection with this question (i.e. pre-contractual liability of the
158
Seller as invoked by the Buyer), the court did not apply the CISG, but instead
the provisions of the Greek Civil Code (articles 197 and 198) having judged,
correctly in our opinion, that the issue of pre-contractual (i.e. established
during the negotiations) liability is not regulated by the CISG, except for the
cases in which the CISG regulates specifically an issue for the period before
the  conclusion  of  the  contract;   therefore  any  remedy  related  to  pre-
159
contractual liability which derives from the provisions of domestic law to
which the rules of private international law of the forum refer to, may apply
in parallel with the provisions of the CISG, since the regulation of pre-
contractual liability as a whole was excluded in the CISG intentionally by the
international legislators.  As is it is known there are opposite opinions which
160
157. Under Greek law the conditions for pre-contractual liability are the following: (i) stage of
negotiations for the conclusion of the contract; (ii) conduct in bad faith (i.e. violation of the principles of
objective good faith and common usage); (iii) fault of the party (wilful or negligent conduct) (culpa in
contrahendo); and (iv) causing prejudice to the other negotiator (this prejudice must be in a casual
relationship with the conduct which is due to bad faith and to fault). GCC art. 197. If the above conditions
are fulfilled then the liability of the negotiator who has acted in bad faith and through its fault consists in
an obligation to compensate the other party. GCC art. 198, § 1. The compensation will not be the “positive
interest” or “(non-) performance damages” owed in the case of contractual liability, but the “negative
interest” or “damages suffered due to reliance on the conduct of the other party” (e.g., on the validity of its
declaration, on the honesty of its conduct, etc.). See STATHOPOULOS, supra note 126, at 79–82. 
158. Huber, supra note 45, at 234.
159. CISG art. 16, § 2.
160. Judgment 4505/2009 at 20. See Valtoudis, supra note 35, at 47, 50; Flambouras, supra note152,
at  §§  676–678;  see  also  ULRICH  G.  SCHROETER,  COMMENTARY  ON  THE  UN  CONVENTION  ON  THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 247–48 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 3d ed.
2010) (“The drafters of the Convention therefore expressly decided against the inclusion of pre-contractual
duties within the scope of the Convention and the matters to which it relates. Against this background, the
existence, scope, and content of pre-contractual duties as well as rules about any liability arising from their
breach (e.g., culpa in contrahendo) are in principle governed by the domestic law invoked under the214 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:171
to a greater or lesser extent suggest that the issue of pre-contractual liability
is within the scope of the CISG.
161
39. The Court, expressing a series of arguments rejected as groundless in
substance the Buyer’s claim as to its base on pre-contractual liability (where
articles 197 and 198 GCC were applied)  under which indemnification was
162
claimed for the damage sustained by the Buyer due to the conclusion of the
Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract. The Buyer in particular claimed that the
Seller at the stage of negotiations breached the principles of good faith and
transactional morals (enlightening and protecting the other party); this was
due to the fact that the Seller, although it was aware from its extended
experience and know-how that the “behaviour” of the Bullet-Proof Material
was  differentiated  according  to  the  design  of  the  Bullet-Proof  Vests,  it
deliberately omitted to notify this to the Buyer and the State Weapon Co. The
Court however judged that the Seller at the time of its participation in the
international tender and also at the time of conclusion of the Bullet-Proof
Material Sale Contract, did not deliberately omit to notify the existence of the
above differentiation, since such conclusion would presuppose that the Bullet-
Proof Material did not operate properly in the specific design of the Bullet-
applicable conflict of laws rules [. . .] Breaking off negotiations and preventing the formation of contract
should not trigger domestic law remedies, unless done so  fraudulently. As the withdrawability and
revocability of offers under Articles 15(2), 16(1) and the right to object or protest under Articles 19(2),
21(2) show, these are matters governed by the Convention, and the respective acts do not trigger liability,
either for loss incurred or claims for the benefit of the expected bargain.”); Huber, supra note 45, at 234
(“[A]s the CISG does not provide a regime for the breach of precontractual duties, those domestic rules
should in principle be applicable irrespective of the fact that the contract underlies the CISG [. . .] there may
be exceptions to that principle: In particular, if the seller has (innocently) induced the buyer to conclude the
contract by not (correctly) informing him about certain defects of the goods and if applicable domestic law
sanctions this behaviour as breach of a precontractual duty, there are good arguments for letting the CISG
prevail over the domestic law.”).
161. See supra note 160. Silvia Gil-Walin, Liability Under Pre-contractual Agreements and their
Application Under Colombian Law and the CISG, NORDIC J. COM. L. 1, § ÉÉÉA (2007) (“[. . .] the
precontractual liability is within the scope of the CISG . . . if a court has to decide a case on pre-contractual
liability the first step for the court is to look at the general principles that inspired the CISG because it
constitutes an unsettled matter. Thus the interpretation and regulation of the pre-contractual liability will
be possible through its principles. Consequently, there is no need to refer and resolve the case according
to the private international law.”); Diane Madeline Goderre, International Negotiations Gone Sour: Pre-
contractual Liability Under the UN Sales Convention, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 257, 280 (1997) (“Regardless
of the apparent obstacles concerning the good-faith provision of Article 7, precontractual liability can
nonetheless be imposed under the Convention”); Georgios Nikolaides, The Importance of Good Faith and
Pre-contractual Liability Pursuant to the Vienna Convention for the International Sale of Goods, CHRON.
PRIVATE L. 891 (2002) (It is suggested that the CISG applies also for pre-contractual liability pursuant to
article 7, § 2 CISG which on the basis of a general principle orders good faith conduct during negotiations).
162. See supra ¶ 35.2011] WHEN BULLETS PENETRATE BULLET-PROOF VESTS 215
Proof Vest that the Buyer manufactured, a fact which, however, had not been
proved.
163
The Court supported its above judgment with the following arguments
which allow the extract of interesting conclusions also within the context of
application of the CISG:
(i) that the specific Bullet-Proof Material was used by the army forces
and the police in more than 50 countries without any problems;
164
(ii) that in the financial tender submitted to the State Weapon Co. on
14.2.2000 at the pre-contractual stage, the Seller pointed out that the
Bullet-Proof Material was a new product in the market and did not
exist  for  enough  time  in  order  to  have  real  experience  data;
165
accordingly, on the Court’s opinion, the Buyer had not violated the
principles  of  good  faith  and  transactional  morals,  but,  on  the
contrary, it complied with its obligations to enlighten and protect the
State Weapon Co. and the Buyer at the pre-contractual stage;
(iii) that even if it was the case that the Bullet-Proof Material “behaved”
differently according to the design and type of the bullet-proof vest,
again the obligation to enlighten and protect the State Weapon Co.
and the Buyer would not reach this point, i.e. that the Seller was
obliged to inform the State Weapon Co. and the Buyer as to this
differentiation, since the State Weapon Co. and the Buyer were
obliged  to  be  informed  and  could  had  been  informed  such
differentiation following their own investigation; this was due to the
fact that they had extended experience and know-how and also had
cooperated in the past (1994) with the Seller and had purchased
before  its  bullet-proof  material  thus  being  aware  of  the  exact
specifications of the Bullet-Proof Material.
As said the above judgment of the Court on the relevant matters of substance
can also lead to the result that article 40 CISG would not apply under the
specific facts;  besides it can be suggested that room would be left for the
166
application of article 35, § 3 CISG.
167
163. See infra ¶ 49(viii).
164. See infra ¶ 49(vi).
165. See supra ¶ 2.
166. See supra ¶¶ 27, 39(ii).
167. See supra ¶¶ 26, 39(iii).216 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:171
(5) Buyer’s Action: Buyer’s Claim for Non-Pecuniary Damage—Court’s
Judgment on Legal Issues
40. As regards the Seller’s claim for monetary compensation due to moral
distress,  the  court,  in  our  opinion,  rightly  judged  that  the  action  was
groundless in law to the extent that it was based on the CISG provisions. In
order to support this judgment the Court invoked the following arguments: (i)
that the non-pecuniary damage is not recovered under the CISG; and (ii) that
based on the theory of foreseeability applied in the CISG the Seller could not
have  foreseen  (subjective  foreseeability)  neither  was  it  obliged  to  have
foreseen (objective foreseeability) the non-pecuniary damage invoked by the
Buyer as a possible consequence of the contractual breach at the time the
contract was concluded.
168
(6)  Buyer’s  Action:  Seller’s  Objection  for  Statutory  Limitation
(Prescription)—The  Bullet-Proof  Material  as  an  Instalment  Contract:
Commencement of Prescription Period—Court’s Judgment on Legal Issues
and Methods of Interpretation
41. The Seller raised an objection for statutory limitation claiming that
since it delivered to the Buyer the agreed instalments (“shipments”) of the
Bullet-Proof Material from January 2002 to July 2002 (see above par. 6), the
Buyer informed it (the Seller) of the lack of conformity with the terms of the
Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract due to the penetration of the sold Bullet-
Proof Material, by the letter dated 9.10.2002 of its parent company State
Weapon Co.  and filed the relevant action on 21.12.2006. Therefore, the
169
claims of the Buyer for lack of conformity of the Bullet-Proof Material with
the  terms  of  the  Bullet-Proof  Material  Sale  Contract  were  subjected  to
statutory limitation (prescription). The court judged that the above objection
of the Seller for statutory limitation was legally grounded based on articles
247, 277, 554 and 555 Greek Civil Code (the “GCC”) as in force at that time
(in conjunction with CISG 39).  The above application of Greek domestic
170
168. Judgment 4505/2009 at 49–50. See also supra ¶ 16.
169. See supra ¶ 7.
170. Prior to the amendments imposed by Law 3043/2002, the following applied: in relation to the
sale of movable goods any action for the reversion of the sale or price reduction or compensation for real
defect or absence of agreed quality was prescribed within six months, GCC art. 554; this prescription
commenced as of delivery of the movable good to the buyer, GCC art. 555; however, the seller could not2011] WHEN BULLETS PENETRATE BULLET-PROOF VESTS 217
provisions was correct since, as the court judged, in connection with statutory
limitation (prescription), there is a gap in the CISG which cannot be regulated
on the basis of a general principle thereof and for that reason, according to the
Greek Private International law (forum), the Greek law was the applicable law,
since it was the law selected by the parties in the Bullet-Proof Material Sale
Contract.
171
42. In order to rebut the above objection for statutory limitation raised by
the Seller, the Buyer claimed inter alia (by means of a reasoned refusal of the
objection of the Seller) the following:
(i) that, by virtue of the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract it was
agreed to deliver 155,000 lm of Bullet-Proof Material in instalments
(“shipments”) which, by the nature of the Bullet-Proof Material Sale
Contract, constituted provisions of one and the same thing; and
(ii) that, due to the fact that the Seller did not comply with the terms of
the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract, the Buyer did not take
delivery of the last quantity of 29,871 lm of Bullet-Proof Material,
thus resulting, due to the fact that the Buyer did not take delivery of
the last quantity of Bullet-Proof Material, that the period for the
statutory  limitation  (prescription)  of  this  claim  (for  lack  of
conformity) had not commenced and thus it could not be statutory
limited (prescribed).
172
From  the  content  of  the  above  argument  it  is  apparent  that  the  Buyer
substantially claimed that the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract was not a
contract for self-existent instalments of goods (i.e. an instalment contract),
173
but a contract for partial deliveries of goods which were not self-existent
amongst them, i.e. a contract where one and the same thing was delivered in
parts;   on  this  basis  the  Buyer  claimed  that  the  statutory  limitation
174
plead the six month prescription, GCC art. 554, if it intentionally concealed the defect or the absence of the
agreed quality. GCC art. 557. 
171. See CISG art. 7, § 2 and arts. 3, § 1 and 10(d) of Law 1792/1998 which implemented the Rome
Convention in Greece. Cf. Monomeles Protodekeo [Single Member First Instance Court of Larissa] Greece,
2005, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050165gr.html;SCHWENZER, supra note 35, at 95
(“limitation of actions are not governed by the CISG but are governed by domestic law or the UN
Limitation Convention”). Greece has not implemented the United Nations Convention on the Limitation
Period in the International Sale of Goods (1974). Please note that same solution would apply under the
current Greek private international law rules included in Regulation 593/2008 on the “Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations.”
172. See supra note 170.
173. See CISG art. 73.
174. See supra ¶ 20. If this was the case (i.e. the 155,000 lm of Bullet-Proof Material were considered
one thing delivered in parts as opposed to independent and self-existent instalments) then the Buyer could218 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:171
(prescription) does not commence if the delivery of the total quantity of
155,000 lm of Bullet-Proof Material (thus including the 11th shipment of the
29,871 lm) sold had not been effected. As mentioned  the Court, correctly
175
in our opinion, judged that the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract was an
instalment contract, since the instalments (“shipments”) of the Bullet-Proof
Material were self-existent as compared among them. Furthermore, following
the findings of Greek legal doctrine, the Court correctly judged that the time
set for the statutory limitation under article 554 GCC commenced, not from
the delivery of the goods to the Buyer (as provided by art. 555 GCC),  but
176
from the date of notification (pursuant to article 39, § 1 CISG) of the Buyer
to the Seller concerning the lack of conformity.  In order to support this
177
interpretation, the Court innovated quoting the following correct, in terms of
teleological nature, argument: a different interpretational approach, consisting
in the non-commencement of the statutory limitation, when the goods have not
been delivered, in case that the Buyer declares an instalment contract avoided
as regards a specific instalment, due to the non-performance of the Seller’s
obligations that derive from the sale contract, according to the provision of
article 73, § 1 CISG, would lead to a situation where the Buyer’s claims
against the Seller could not be prescribed, which cannot be tolerated by any
legal regime.  That is in the latter case, the Court, practically considered that
178
still, under art. 51, § 1 CISG, avoid the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract with respect to the non-
conforming part (provided of course that the non-conformity constituted fundamental breach) since the
latter provision permits the Buyer to sever the portion of a contract relating to a missing or non-conforming
part of a single delivery: cf. Flechtner, supra note 73, at 89.
175. See supra ¶ 20.
176. See supra note 170.
177. Judgment 4505/2009 at 12, 53 (“[W]hen the Greek Law is applicable and more specifically the
provision of Article 554 of the Civil Code prior to its amendment with Law 3043/2002, which provided that
the statutory limitation for movable goods had a term of six months and therefore it was shorter than the
two-year [notice] period provided for by Article 39(2) of the CISG, it must be accepted that for sales falling
within the sphere of application of the CISG, the period of six months statutory limitation provided for by
Article 554 of the Civil Code commences not from the handing over of the goods to the buyer, but as of the
notification of the buyer to the seller provided for by Article 39(1) of the CISG.”). Such interpretation was
necessary in order to remedy issues created due to the fact that the prescription period set out in article 554
GCC (6 months) was shorter than the period set out in article 39, § 2 CISG (2 years). See Monomeles
Protodekeo [Single Member First Instance Court of Larissa] Greece; Valtoudis, supra note 152, at 341;
Athanasios  Pouliades,  The  Obligations  of  Seller  and  Buyer  Under  the  Vienna  Convention  for  the
International Sale of Goods—General Characteristics, ISSUES  ON  THE APPLICATION  OF  THE VIENNA
CONVENTION  FOR  THE  INTERNATIONAL  SALE  OF  GOODS 89 (F. Doris  &  A.  Chelidonis eds., 2004).
Following the amendment of the Greek Civil Code by Law 3043/2002, any action of the buyer for real
defect or absence of agreed quality in the sale of movable goods is prescribed within two years, see GCC
art. 554; this prescription commences as of delivery of the goods to the buyer, see GCC art. 555.
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with the opposite interpretation it would be led to a socially intolerable result
(argumentum ad absurdum).
179
Based on the above it is apparent that the Court, in order to provide an
acceptable solution to the issue as to the time of commencement of the
prescription (domestic law issue) of the Buyer’s remedies in an instalment
contract  governed  by  the  CISG  (issue  governed  by  the  CISG)  it  made
reference to a method of interpretation (teleological) used under Greek law in
order to interpret domestic provisions. This methodological approach raises,
however, the issue whether methods of interpretation used in domestic legal
systems (literal, historical, systematic and teleological interpretation) can also
be used to interpret the provisions of the CISG. We share the opinion that the
use of these interpretative methods is acceptable  since these are methods
180
shared within the common legal tradition of the Contracting States and are not
exclusively attached to one or more domestic laws; however, such use will
only be acceptable within the context of the Convention without reference to
domestic legal doctrine and case law.  On this basis it is suggested that when
181
the provision(s) of the CISG is (are) interpreted one could adopt the following
model of interpretation: usually first, look to the actual text of the Convention
in the original languages (i.e. literal interpretation), make reference to the
preparatory  discussions  and  the  secretariat  commentary  (i.e.  historical
interpretation),  find  solutions  arising  from  the  “location”  of  a  specific
provision in the CISG and its interrelationship to other CISG provisions or
general principles (i.e. systematic interpretation) and/or find solutions on the
basis of the Convention’s general principles  with particular emphasis on the
182
need to promote uniformity and to observe good faith in international trade
183
(i.e. teleological interpretation). On this basis it would be preferable if the
Court had based the adopted interpretation-suggested solution on article 7, § 1
CISG i.e. that non-commencement of prescription in an instalment contract
179. For  the  concept  of  the  argumentum  ad  absurdum  within  the  context  of  the  teleological
interpretation, see P. PAPANIKOLAOU, METHODOLOGY OF PRIVATE LAW AND INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TRANSACTIONS 179 (2000).
180. See Georgios Nikolaides, The Vienna Convention (law 2532/1997) on the International Sale
of Goods (CISG): its Creation and the Compromises that it Expresses, Critical Review of Legal Doctrine
and Practice 130 (1999). Few authors are skeptical on the use of the teleological method of interpretation
within the CISG context. See P. PAPANIKOLAU, K. ROUSSOS, K. CHRISTODOULOU & A. KARABATZOS, THE
NEW LAW OF THE SELLER’S LIABILITY 267–68 (Ant. N. Sakkoulas ed., 2003). A. Chelidonis, Vienna
Convention on the International Sale of Goods—Setting the Limits of the Sphere of Application and
Theory of Legal Transactions, CHRON. PRIVATE L. 871, 875 (2001).
181. CISG art. 7, § 1.
182. CISG art. 7, § 2.
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prior to delivery of all instalments would be an interpretation which would
lead to a socially intolerable result and therefore to non-compliance with good
faith in international trade (which in our opinion would obviously be the case).
43.  In  order  to  rebut  the  above  objection  for  statutory  limitation
(prescription)  the Buyer further claimed that the Seller, being aware due to
184
its extensive experience and know-how at the time the risk was transferred to
it, that the Bullet-Proof Material failed in its antiballistic qualities with respect
to the type of the bulletproof vest for which it (the Bullet-Proof Material)
would be used, although it (the Seller) was obliged to notify to the Buyer the
lack of  the quality agreed  upon, it  deliberately concealed  it in  order to
undertake the procurement,  and that, if the Buyer was aware that the Bullet-
185
Proof Material of the Seller responds differently according to the intended use
and it is possible that it is rendered inappropriate, it (the Buyer) would never
have  proceeded  with  the  conclusion  of  the  Bullet-Proof  Material  Sale
Contract. The Court judged that: (i) this allegation of the Buyer constituted a
counter-objection against the statutory limitation (prescription) objection
186
and it was legally grounded based on article 557 GCC,  since in this case the
187
period for statutory limitation is set to twenty years  instead of six months;
188 189
and (ii) article 557 GCC applied as part of the law to which the Private
International Law of Greece (forum) refers to, since the CISG does not include
a  specific  provision  or  general  principle  that  regulates  the  statutory
limitation.  As mentioned before it is questionable whether the Buyer could
190
had raised a similar argument within the context of article 40 CISG in order
to avoid the adverse circumstances from articles 38 and 39 CISG.
191
184. See supra ¶¶ 41, 42.
185. See supra ¶ 2.
186. See supra ¶¶ 41, 42.
187. See supra note 170.
188. GCC art. 249. The term of prescription for claims stemming from contractual rights is, as a
general rule, twenty years, See GCC art. 249. Exceptionally (e.g., in the case of commercial claims or claims
for salary or fees or interest or rent, etc.), it is five years or, when special provision is made for this,
different, that is, even shorter GCC art. 554. See supra note 170; STATHOPOULOS, supra note 126, at
207–08.
189. GCC art. 554. See supra ¶¶ 41, 42, note 170.
190. See CISG art. 7, § 2 and arts. 3, § 1 and 10(d) of Law 1792/1998 which implemented the Rome
Convention in Greece. Please note that same solution would apply under the current Greek private
international  law  rules  included  in  Regulation  593/2008  on  the  “Law  Applicable  to  Contractual
Obligations”; see also supra ¶ 41, note 170.
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44. Finally, the Seller justifiably denied the above counter-objection of
the Buyer,  claiming that its liability as the producer of the raw material (i.e.
192
the Bullet-Proof Material) is exhausted in the specifications possessed by the
Bullet-Proof Material, which were successfully tested and confirmed not only
before the Seller’s selection as supplier,  but also during the new ballistic
193
tests conducted on 30.10.2002 and 01.11.2002.
194
(7) Buyer’s Action: Seller’s Objection for Liable Non-Mitigation by the
Buyer of Its Loss (Article 77 CISG)—Court’s Judgment on Legal Issues
45. The Seller claimed that the Buyer was liable for not mitigating its
loss, since it could have achieved a higher security (protection) cap for the
Bullet-Proof Vests through the addition of another polyurethane material
(weighing 24 g) which it could have acquired from the Seller, of a value of
€0,33 per Bullet-Proof Vest, which corresponded, for the improvement of the
6,900 Bullet-Proof Vests to the total amount of €2,277, against the amount of
€418,509.29 which the Buyer born in order to repair the Bullet-Proof Vests.
195
The Court judged that this allegation of the Seller constituted an objection
(“enstasi”) and was legally grounded based on article 77 CISG (i.e. duty of the
damaged party to mitigate its loss).  The fact that the Court characterised this
196
allegation as an objection (“enstasi”) means that the Court accepted the
following: (i) a defence that the party who seeks damages has violated its duty
to mitigate damages under article 77 CISG has to be raised by the party
against whom damages are sought and is not to be ex officio examined by a
court;  and (ii) the party against whom damages are sought has the burden
197
192. See supra ¶ 43.
193. See supra ¶ 2.
194. See supra ¶ 8.
195. See supra ¶¶ 11, 30, 32.
196. Judgment 4505/2009 at 54–55. Such allegation definitely falls within the ambit of article 77
CISG since it is accepted that under this provision a buyer of non-conforming goods may be under a duty
to have them repaired in order to prevent them from worsening or to avoid consequential losses. See
Ingeborg Schwenzer & Simon Manner, The Pot Calling the Kettle Black: The Impact of the Non-Breaching
Party’s (Non-) Behaviour on its CISG-Remedies, SHARING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS
NATIONAL BOUNDARIES: FESTSCHRIFT FOR ALBERT H. KRITZER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS EIGHTIETH
BIRTHDAY 470, 481 (C.B. Andersen & U.G. Schroeter eds., 2008). Peter Riznik, Article 77 CISG:
Reasonableness of the Measures Undertaken to Mitigate the Loss, PACE L. SCH. INST. INT’L COM. L.
§ 4.2.2(a), available at http://www.cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/riznik.html.
197. This is a controversial issue. See SCHWENZER, supra note 35, at 1048. On the opinion that this
defence is examined by a court ex officio, see STOLL & GRUBER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION
ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 793 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d
ed. 2005) (“Article 77 not only grants the party liable for damages a right to withhold payment, but222 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:171
to prove that the party who seeks damages has violated its duty to mitigate loss
under article 77 CISG.
198
(8) Buyer’s Action: Buyer’s Claim for the Payment of Price Under a Sales
Contract Concluded for Parts of the Bullet-Proof Material That Would Be Left
over  from  the  Process  (Waste)—Court’s  Judgment  on  Legal  Issues  and
Substance
46. The Court did not accept that a contract had been concluded by virtue
of which the Seller was obliged to purchase from the Buyer the parts of the
Bullet-Proof Material that would be left over from the process (waste) for a
price of 5 Deutsch Mark (“DM”) or €2.56 per kg and thus accepted that the
Seller had no contractual obligation to take delivery of the quantity of the
Bullet-Proof Material that was left over after the process conducted by the
Buyer and therefore he was not obliged to pay to the Buyer the amount of
€8,151.08 as the purchase price of the above quantity. The Buyer based its
request on the fact that the offer of the Seller to the Buyer dated 14.2.2000
included a relevant clause with which the Seller accepted to purchase the parts
of the Bullet-Proof Material that would be left over from the process (waste)
for a price of 5 DM per kg. The Court however, rejected the Buyer’s request,
being based on clause 9.2 of the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract where it
was provided that this agreement supersedes any other relevant document.
199
establishes a defense that may extinguish the claim and must be ex officio considered.”); Bundesgerichtshof
[Federal  Supreme  Court]  Germany,  24  Mar.  1999,  available  at  http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
990324g1.html (“CISG article 77 establishes a defense that may exclude a claim and must be considered
sua sponte.”); Arbitral Award of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) No. 9187/1999 (1999)
(“The party claiming damages has an obligation to mitigate the loss (Art. 77 CISG), otherwise it is deprived
of its right to damages. Whether the claiming party has complied with this duty has to be considered by the
Arbitral Tribunal ex officio, whereby the burden of proof for the fact that a loss could have been avoided
lies with the party owing damages.”). On the opinion that this defence has to be raised by the party against
whom damages is sought, see Oberster Gerichtshof [Supreme Court] Austria, 6 Feb. 1996, available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960206a3.html (“The claim of the breach of the duty to mitigate damages
is an exception leading to the loss of the claim for damages. It requires the [sellers] to put forward detailed
facts and the supporting evidence showing why the [buyer] has breached its duty to mitigate damages, the
possibilities of alternative conduct and which part of the damages would have been prevented by this
alternative conduct.”). 
198. See SCHWENZER, supra note 35, at 1048 (“The burden of proof for the claim that the promisee
has violated his duty to mitigate damages under Article 77 rests on the promisor. On the other hand, the
promisee bears the burden of proof insofar as he claims damages under Article 74 for measures taken to
avoid  or mitigate loss”);  Oberster  Gerichtshof [Supreme  Court]  Austria,  6  Feb.  1996,  available  at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960206a3.html;  cf.  Arbitral Award  of the International  Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) No. 9187/1999 (1999).
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(9) Buyer’s Action: Buyer’s Claim for the Seller’s Portion in the Ballistic
Tests Expenses
47. The Court adjudicated the Buyer the amount of €7,670.87 which
corresponded to the Seller’s portion in the expenses of the ballistic tests
conducted in the ballistic center of the University “G” in the U.K.
200
IV. SELLER’S ACTION: OBJECTION BY THE BUYER FOR LACK OF
CONFORMITY—BUYER’S ACTION: BUYER’S CLAIM FOR
COMPENSATION—COURT’S JUDGMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE
BUYER’S OBJECTION AND COMPENSATION CLAIM
A. Criteria for the Substantiation of the Judgment That the Bullet-Proof
Material Was in Conformity with the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract
48. By judging that there was no lack of conformity of the Bullet-Proof
Material with the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract in the sense set out in
the CISG the Court:
(i) opined  on  the  substantial  grounds  of  the  Buyer’s  claim  for
compensation (€612,423.655) for the damage that the latter suffered
due to the request of the Ministry for repair of the Bullet-Proof Vests
and the subsequent replacement of the Bullet-Proof Material with
aramidic fibres (Kevlar);  and
201
(ii) rejected the relevant objection for the lack of conformity of the
Bullet-Proof Material with the requirements of the Bullet-Proof
Material Sale Contract that the Buyer raised in the context of the
Seller’s action.
202
The Court grounded its above judgment on the determination that at the time
the risk was transferred  the Seller complied with the Bullet-Proof Material
203
Sales Contract by delivering to the Buyer the agreed Bullet-Proof Material,
with a width of 160 cm per quantity, quality and kind in accordance with the
terms  of  the  Bullet-Proof  Material  Sale  Contract,  without  having  actual
defects and equipped with the reasonably expected qualities that the Seller
200. See supra ¶ 2.
201. See supra ¶¶ 32, 34.
202. See supra ¶ 17.
203. See supra ¶ 28.224 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:171
presented to the Buyer  in the filing of its bid dated 14.2.2000 to the State
204
Weapon Co. (holding company of the Buyer) and which were confirmed
during the ballistic tests conducted in the University “G” in the U.K. for the
selection of the Buyer’s supplier,  in which tests, after inspecting the conduct
205
of the unprocessed Bullet-Proof Material and not its application in a specific
model of bulletproof vest, it was selected as the most appropriate one among
other materials.
49. The Court supported the above, correct in our opinion, judgment in
an exemplary manner with a number of arguments  which derived from: (i)
206
the negotiations between the parties;  (ii) the interpretation of the terms of
207
the  Bullet-Proof  Material  Sale  Contract;   and  (iii)  the  total  of  the
208
circumstances in question including non-contractual ones (e.g., existence of
compliance  certificates,  test  results,  acceptance  of  instalments  already
delivered).   These  arguments  substantiated  in  the  CISG  context,  the
209
conformity of the Bullet-Proof Material sold with the requirements and terms
204. Cf. CISG arts. 35, 36, 66, 67, 68, 69.
205. See supra ¶ 2.
206. These arguments appear to be legally grounded on principles of law. Judgment 4505/2009 at
14–15 (“In particular, the primary contractual obligation of the seller is to hand over to the buyer goods
which are of the quantity, quality and description and conform to the requirements of the contract (CISG
Article 35(1). In parallel, the subjective (CISG Article 35(2)(b) and (c)) and objective criteria, respectively,
are set out (CISG Article 35(2)(a) and (d)), which, also within the framework of the Civil Code are used
for the conceptive determination of the real defects, while it is still possible to agree upon qualities, whose
possible lack would not have been [otherwise] considered as a lack of conformity of the goods to the
requirements of the contract. In other words, the seller has a main contractual obligation to hand over the
goods free of defects, actual or legal, and equipped with the reasonably expected (and not compulsory
“agreed upon”) qualities (Multi-Member First Instance Court of Thessalonica 22513/2003, as above).
Respectively, a form of breach of the contractual obligations of the seller is also the handing over to the
buyer of defective goods or, although not defective, of such a kind that they do not conform to the
requirements of the contract as, e.g., when the goods handed over do not have the qualities agreed upon.
Nevertheless, the parties, pursuant to CISG Article 6, may agree upon when the goods do conform to the
requirements of the contract, and the content of the said agreement shall be determined by the interpretation
of the contract and the declarations of the parties (CISG Article 8). If no such agreement exists, the extent
for the conformity may derive from any usages to which the parties have agreed and by any practices which
they have established between themselves (CISG Article 9(1), otherwise, by the usages of international trade
which the parties knew or ought to have known and which the parties are presumed to have applied to their
mutual sales contract. If none of the above applies, then the conformity of the goods to the contract shall
be judged based on the above criteria set out in the provisions of CISG Article 35(2) (D. Flambouras
“International Sales” in Ch. Pamboukis (edit.), International Transactions Law, Athens, Law Library (to be
published) paragraph 228, with reference to a judgment law of a foreign court”). 
207. See CISG art. 8; see also supra ¶¶ 2, 39, and see infra part v.
208. See CISG arts. 6, 8; see also supra ¶ 4, and see infra parts iv, v, vi.
209. See CISG art. 8, § 2; see also supra ¶ 6, and see also infra parts i, ii, iii, iv.2011] WHEN BULLETS PENETRATE BULLET-PROOF VESTS 225
of the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract  and can be summarised as
210
follows:
(i) Instalments  (“shipments”)  no.  7,  9  and  10  of  the  Bullet-Proof
Material  which  were  accompanied  by  compliance  (quality)
certificates,  were received by the Buyer and successfully passed
211
the  quantitative  and  qualitative  controls  by  the  competent
departments of purchases and quality control of the Buyer,  without
212
the Buyer rejecting any quantity of Bullet-Proof Material due to an
actual defect or absence of the reasonably expected qualities or
because  there  was  a  qualitative  deviation  from  the  agreed
specifications, since the Bullet-Proof Material was indeed of first
class  quality  and  fulfilled  by  100%  the  specifications  and  its
characteristics.
213
(ii) The exceptional quality of the Bullet-Proof Material was additionally
evidenced by the ballistic tests conducted on 30.10.2002 at the Greek
Ballistic Station  in the context of which approximately 80 shots
214
210. CISG art. 35, § 1, Judgment 4505/2009 at 93–98.
211. The “compliance certificates” constituted documents that the Seller was obliged, under the
Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract (clause 2.6), to hand over, in the sense of article 30 CISG. See CORINNE
WIDMER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 1015
(Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 3d ed. 2010) (“The answer to the question whether the
seller has to hand over documents, and, if so, which documents, is to be found in the contract, any usage
applicable in accordance with Article 9, and the principle of good faith.”).
212. See supra ¶ 6.
213. In consistence with the above under (i) argument, the Court accepted that each instalment
(“shipment”) which was delivered to the Buyer, was accompanied by the respective sale invoices and
compliance certificates with the specifications of the Bullet-Proof Material for the quantities ordered by the
Buyer. See Judgment 4505/2009 at 76. Furthermore, as concluded by the Court’s assumptions quoted at
the same point, the compliance certificates: (i) certified that the Bullet-Proof Material supplied by the Seller
to the Buyer fulfilled the applicable manufacture specifications for product level which was inspected in
accordance with the internal control procedures used by the Seller; and (ii) made clear reference to the fact
that the Buyer should inspect the product level (of the Bullet-Proof Material) for the actual application (i.e.
its use for the manufacture of Bullet-Proof Vests) and that the Buyer was not released from its obligation
to conduct the regular inspection of the products (i.e. the Bullet-Proof Material) it took delivery of. Id. From
the above content of the compliance certificates which accompanied the quantities (instalments) of Bullet-
Proof Material delivered to the Buyer but also from the affidavit of an officer of the Seller dated 5.11.2007,
the Court concluded that the Seller, in its capacity as the raw material supplier guaranteed only that the raw
material (i.e. the Bullet-Proof Material) will conform with the relevant specifications (included in the
Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract), See supra ¶ 4, and no other guarantees would be granted; it was,
therefore, a responsibility of the manufacturer of the Bullet-Proof Vests (i.e. the Buyer) to select the
materials of the vests, to design and properly manufacture the Bullet-Proof Vests, so as to achieve the
required protection level (a level provided for in the Bullet-Proof Vests Supply Contract), see supra ¶ 3,
and see infra parts iv, v, vi. See Judgment 4505/2009 at 76.
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were taken on the same Bullet-Proof Material and in particular in
samples randomly selected from the batch No. 110097 of the Bullet-
Proof  Material and mainly from the box  numbered  200203244,
which was used to manufacture the Bullet-Proof Vest that, during the
ballistic tests on 20.9.2002, had been punctured at the fifth shot; on
the above tests (conducted on 30.10.2002) the Bullet-Proof Material
did not exhibit any unusual conduct, so as to be characterized as
suspicious for the failure.  Based on these findings the Failure
215
Analysis dated 10.3.2003 concluded that from the results of the
ballistic tests, the failure of the Bullet-Proof Vest was not attributed
to systematic failure of the used Bullet-Proof Material.
216
(iii) As regards the puncture of the Bullet-Proof Vest on 20.9.2002  and
217
the equation model of the bullet-proof vest under examination on
1.11.2002  the Court noted the following: (1) both ballistic tests
218
were conducted at the Greek Ballistic Station,  which however was
219
not certified by the international standards; (2) ammunition was used
which was not provided for in Annex B of the Bullet-Proof Vests
Supply Contract;  (3) during the third test, larger velocities were
220
measured in comparison with the specifications requirements; (4)
during the second test, the five shots were taken in an imaginary line
on  the  equation  model  of  the  type  of  bulletproof  vest  under
examination, instead of being conducted in a triangular layout, with
the observance  of  specific  distances of  the points to  which  the
Bullet-Proof Material is shot, in accordance with the safety standard
NIJ 0101.03. In view of the above, the Court judged that the results
of the ballistic tests could not be considered safe and creditworthy.
(iv) Based on the ballistic tests on the design equation model [see above
subpar. (iii)], the Failure Analysis  concluded that the puncture was
221
a strong indication of malfunction of the Bullet-Proof Material in the
specific  design (i.e.  of  the Bullet-Proof  Vest).  Again  the Court
accepted that the Seller bore no contractual liability for the conduct
of the end product, i.e. the Bullet-Proof Vest. The Seller was not a
215. See supra ¶ 8.
216. See supra ¶ 8.
217. See supra ¶ 7.
218. See supra ¶ 8.
219. See supra ¶ 7.
220. See supra ¶ 8.
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contracting party to the Bullet-Proof Vests Supply Contract  and
222
therefore it (the Seller) had no liability towards the Ministry for the
domestic manufacturing and the end product (Bullet-Proof Vest).
223
(v) Upon execution of the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract  the
224
Seller undertook the obligation to deliver to the Buyer 155.000 lm of
raw (unprocessed) Bullet-Proof Material of 160 cm width. In the
Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract, there was no reference in the
form of reference, incorporation or Annex, neither to the Bullet-
Proof Vest Supply Contract  or the Annexes thereof not to the
225
invitation dated 24.1.2000 of the State Weapon Co. to the Seller for
the submission of a financial offer as regards antiballistic material
for  the  manufacture  of  a  bulletproof  vest,   nor  to  any  other
226
contractual text or document.  Furthermore, in accordance with cl.
227
222. See supra ¶ 3.
223. The argument set out in sub-paragraph (iv) evidences that the Court interpreted the Bullet-Proof
Material Sale Contract (without though making detailed reference to the criteria of art. 8 CISG), see supra
note 206, and see infra note 227, and found that no clause was included (or otherwise incorporated), see
infra part v, under which the Seller took any liability for the conduct of the end product (i.e. the Bullet-
Proof Vest). See CISG arts. 6, 8; see also supra note 213. On this basis to the extent that the Bullet-Proof
Material complied with the specifications of the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract it was in conformity
with the latter irrespectively of the “conduct” of the Bullet-Proof Vest to be manufactured from the Bullet-
Proof Material. See CISG art. 35, § 1. In any event the “conduct” of the Bullet-Proof Vest was to be
determined by reference to the Bullet-Proof Vests Supply Contract, see supra ¶ 3, in which, as the Court
correctly stressed, the Seller was not a contracting party and to which the Bullet-Proof Material Sale
Contract did not make reference in the form of reference, incorporation, Annexes or otherwise. See infra
part v.
224. See supra ¶ 4.
225. See supra ¶ 3.
226. See supra ¶ 2.
227. See supra part (iv). The arguments set out in sub-paragraphs (iv) and (v) evidence that the Court
considered the conformity of the Bullet-Proof Material to the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract by virtue
of article 35, § 1 CISG since the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract contained sufficient details of the
requirements to be satisfied by the Bullet-Proof Material for the purposes of this last provision. The Court
did not seem to have applied any of the criteria set out in article 35, § 2 CISG since the latter only applies
in so far as the contract does not contain any, or contains only insufficient, details of the requirements to
be satisfied by the goods for the purposes of article 35, § 1 CISG. See SCHWENZER, supra note 35, at 575;
see also CESARE MASSIMO BIANCA, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA
SALES CONVENTION GIUFFRÉ, MILAN 272 (C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonell ed., 1987) (“[T]he criteria of Article
35 are to be applied only in the absence of an express or implied contractual provision. Thus, one must first
seek the proper content of the seller’s obligations through interpretation of the contract (see Article 8) [. . .]
these criteria cannot be applied if there is a minimum of contractual indications about the goods to be
provided by the seller.”]. Harry M. Flechtner, Funky Mussels, a Stolen Car, and Decrepit Used Shoes: Non-
Conforming Goods and Notice thereof under the CISG, 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2008); Kristian Maley, The
Limits to the Conformity of Goods in the UN CISG, 12 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 82, 104 (2009) (“As
the seller’s obligations in relation to the goods are defined according to the parties’ agreement, the presence228 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:171
9.2 of the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract, the Seller and the
Buyer  agreed  that  this  contract  supersedes  any  other  relevant
document.  Consequently, the terms referred to in the Bullet-Proof
228
Material Sales Contract formed the contractual relations between the
Seller and the Buyer, excluding the possibility of applying any other
contractual term.
229
(vi) The Seller, in its capacity as supplier of raw material, had guaranteed
under clause 7.3 of the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract that the
Bullet-Proof Material would be free from any apparent or hidden
defect (i.e. it provided a guarantee for its quality) for a period of one
(1) year commencing from the date of delivery;  nevertheless, no
230
corresponding clause was included in the Bullet-Proof Material Sale
Contract providing for the granting of warranty by the Seller for the
proper  design  and  manufacturing  of  the  bulletproof  vests.
Consequently, the Seller could not bear any responsibility for the
storage conditions, the cutting manner and the placement manner of
the Bullet-Proof Material in the bullet-proof vest by the occasional
manufacturer of bullet-proof vests.  Indeed, despite the fact that the
231
bulletproof  vests  that  were  manufactured  by  the  Bullet-Proof
of defects is assessed subjectively.”). By means of commentary we note that the Court should had made
express reference to the criteria of article 8 CISG, Judgment 4505/2009 (solely referred to article 8 CISG
with no further analysis), in order to determine the requirements of the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract
and the primary test (which was in principle examined by the Court) would be what characteristics of the
goods are laid down in the contract by means of quantitative and qualitative description. See SCHWENZER,
supra note 35, at 571. BIANCA, supra note 227, at 272; Henschel, supra note 114, at § 4.1 (“[. . .] the
interpretation of what requirements can be made of the goods . . . is decided on the basis of an interpretation
of the agreement between the parties, so that Article 8 and 9 are actively considered”); Maley, supra note
227, at 108–09. Thomas Neumann, Features of Article 35 in the Vienna Convention: Equivalence, Burden
of Proof and Awareness, 11 VINDOBONA J. COM. L. & ARB. (VJ) 81, §§ 4, 8 (2007) (“The result of using
art. 8 in determining the content of the agreement is that both express and implied statements constitute
duties of the Seller. Also implied statements that the Seller could not be unaware of or that a reasonable
Seller would have understood impose duties with which he must comply.”). 
228. See supra ¶ 4.
229. This statement of the Court is clearly based on articles 6 and 8 CISG and article 35, § 2 CISG
(i.e. “Except where the parties have agreed otherwise”) excluding thus from the parties’ contractual
relationship under the circumstances under examination any rights and obligations not expressly set out in
the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract. See Richard Hyland, Conformity of Goods to the Contract Under
the UN Sales Convention and the UCC, EINHEITLICHES KAUFRECHT UND NATIONALS OBLIGATIONENRECHT
305, 309 ( Peter Schlechtriem ed., 1987) (“. . . the Convention expressly permits the disclaimer of implied
conformity requirements”).
230. See supra ¶ 4. The Court used the word “guaranteed” in the sense that the seller “promised” and
not in the sense of an accessory obligation. Judgement 4505/2009.
231. See Judgement 4505/2009 at 78; see also supra note 213.2011] WHEN BULLETS PENETRATE BULLET-PROOF VESTS 229
Material were used by the army forces and the police in more than
50  countries  (thus  proving  that  the  Bullet-Proof  Material  is
appropriate for the manufacture of bulletproof vests), in no place in
the  world  does  the  Seller  undertake  the  responsibility  for
manufacturing deficiencies or defects of the bulletproof vests, since
the manufacturing of bulletproof vests by third manufacturers falls
beyond the control of the Seller and consequently its liability is
limited only for any defects of the Bullet-Proof Material it supplies
(which, as mentioned, behaved exceptionally in all ballistic tests
conducted in the context of tests using this material).  
232 233
(vii) Based on the above,  the sole liability for the necessary protection
234
level of the Bullet-Proof Vests required by the Authority (which
protection level  was  provided  in  the Bullet-Proof  Vests  Supply
Contract)  was borne by:
235
232. See supra ¶¶ 2, 8, 10.
233. The content of the argument set out in sub-paragraph (vi) shows that the Court interpreted the
Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract and found that no clause was included under which the Seller took any
liability for the proper design and manufacturing of the bulletproof vests. See CISG arts. 6, 8. On this basis
to the extent that the Bullet-Proof Material complied with the specifications of the Bullet-Proof Material
Sale Contract it was in conformity with the latter even if the Bullet-Proof Material “behaved” differently
according to the design and type of the bullet-proof best. See CISG art. 35, § 1; see also supra ¶ 39, note
213. Since the Court considered the conformity of the Bullet-Proof Material to the Butter-Proof Material
Sale Contract by virtue of article 35, § 1 CISG there was no necessity for the application of article 35, § 2
CISG. See supra note 227. However, the argument of the Court set out in sub-paragraph (vi) is also useful
within the context of article 35, § 2(b) CISG which is implicated if the buyer informs the seller, at or before
the time of contract conclusion, that it intends to use the goods for a particular purpose. See Flechtner,
supra note 227, at 4 (similar arguments related to the knowledge of the Seller that the goods would be used
for a particular purpose were raised by the Buyer within the context of its action based on pre-contractual
liability); supra ¶ 39. In particular from the Court’s analysis as set out in sub-paragraph (vi) it is evident
that, on the Court’s opinion, there was no “particular purpose” within the meaning of article 35, § 2(b)
CISG regarding the performance of the Bullet-Proof Vests to be manufactured from the Bullet-Proof
Material. In order to render the above opinion the Court also relied on the fact that the same was acceptable
in the international market for the sale of bullet-proof material (i.e. that in no place in the world the Seller
would bear any responsibility for the storage conditions, the cutting manner and the placement manner of
the Bullet-Proof Material in the bullet-proof vest by the occasional manufacturer of bullet-proof vests).
Furthermore it is accepted by legal doctrine that there may not be any “reliance” for the purposes of article
35, § 2(b) CISG, if the buyer takes part in the selection of the goods, examines the goods before purchase
or provides specific specifications. See SCHWENZER, supra note 35, at 582; Neumann, supra note 227, at
§ 9. It is suggested that the above circumstances applied since the Buyer (and/or the State Weapon Co.) set
specifications for the Bullet-Proof Material, took part in its selection and examined it at the pre-contractual
stage, see supra ¶ 2; furthermore the Seller informed the Buyer that “the Bullet-Proof Material was a new
product in the market and that it did not exist for enough time in order to have real experience data.” See
supra ¶¶ 2, 39.
234. See supra parts iv, v, vi.
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(1) the State Weapon Co. since by virtue of the Bullet-Proof Vests
Supply Contract  the State Weapon Co. had warranted the
236
proper conduct of the antiballistic materials procured; and
(2) the  Buyer  since  in  the  Bullet-Proof  Vests  Manufacturing
Contract in which the Buyer was a party it had been provided
that  the  Bullet-Proof  Vests  Supply  Contract  constituted  an
annex and integral part thereof.
237
(viii) Both penetrations  could not be characterised as a systematic
238
malfunction of the Bullet-Proof Vests, since, both:
(1) in the ballistic tests conducted in the Greek Ballistic Station on
4.9.2003 (where shots were taken on Bullet-Proof Material of
the same batch with that of the puncture in the tests dated
20.9.2002 and across the gap that was formed in the junction
point of the two front parts of the Bullet-Proof Vest); and
(2) in the ballistic tests conducted by the Seller in its internal shot
range and in an international certified lab in the Netherlands,  
239
no penetration was noticed.
In addition, prior to the event (the penetration) on 20.9.2002, 6,900
Bullet-Proof  Vests  had  been  delivered  in  instalments  to  the
Ministry  of which, according to the Bullet-Proof Vests Supply
240
Contract,  one sample had been inspected from each of the ten
241
instalments (“shipments”) of Bullet-Proof Material, without any
penetration of the Bullet-Proof Vest. Besides, in the Bullet-Proof
Vests Supply Contract a “systematic malfunction” is “the case of
having this malfunction present on the same antiballistic material
within the warranty period and in a percentage exceeding 10% of the
delivered  materials”   which,  in  the  Court’s  opinion,  was  not
242
discovered in this case.
243
236. Id.
237. See supra ¶ 5.
238. See supra ¶ 7.
239. See supra ¶ 10.
240. See supra ¶ 11.
241. See supra ¶ 3.
242. Id.
243. The content of the arguments set out in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii), (iii) and (viii) shows that in order
to interpret the agreement and establish that the Bullet-Proof Material complied with the requirements of
the Bullet-Proof Material Sale Contract, see CISG art. 35, § 1, the Court also considered non-contractual
circumstances  (i.e.  the results  of other ballistic  tests  in  international certified lab,  the fact  that  ten
instalments of Bullet-Proof Material had already been delivered by the Seller and inspected without
problems, the fact that there were certificates of quality). See CISG art. 8, § 2; Neumann, supra note 227,2011] WHEN BULLETS PENETRATE BULLET-PROOF VESTS 231
V. END NOTE
50. As a general conclusion Judgment 4505/2009 can be considered a
good example for the application of the CISG providing useful guidance and,
in  principle, correct interpretation  for many provisions.  There  of  course
“weaknesses” and room for more clarity and completeness.  It is beyond
244
doubt however the Court’s genuine interest and effort to provide solutions
“from the CISG” to “issues relating to the CISG” without recourse to Greek
domestic provisions and thus “to promote uniformity”;  as the Court rightly
245
put it
[T]he interpretation of the CISG by national courts, by virtue of the provision of Article
7(1) CISG, must be made “autonomously,” through its uniqueness and originality thereof
as a text, i.e., through the system of its provisions and general principles and free of any
ethnocentric approaches, “unique” terms of domestic law, and [free] of methods that
usually follow for the interpretation of domestic provisions, since otherwise that may
result in the application of institutions and provisions of domestic laws and furthermore,
in undesired lack of uniformity in its application.
246
It is a hope (and a wish) that Judges and Arbitrators when applying the CISG
will always keep this fundamental rule in mind.
at § 13-14 (suggesting, with reference to relevant case law, that under article 8, § 2 CISG a court can take
into consideration non-contractual circumstances in order to interpret the sale contract under article 35, § 1
CISG].
244. See, e.g., supra ¶¶ 19, 20, 25, 26, 28, 31, 42, and note 227.
245. See supra ¶¶ 36–38.
246. See  P.  Giannopoulos,  Principles  of  Interpretation  of  the  Convention  of  the  UN  for  the
International Sale of Goods, ARMENOPOULOS ANNIVERSARY 83 (2000); Flambouras, supra note 152, at
§ 688. Larry DiMatteo, Lucien Dhooge, Stephanie Greene, Virginia Maurer & Marisa Pagnattaro, The
Interpretative Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299, 311 (2004); Flechtner, supra note 227, at 5 (“This methodology aims at
avoiding . . . the tendency to see the international text of the CISG through the lends of preconceptions
derived from domestic law.”); Joseph Lookofsky, Walking the Article 7(2) Tightrope Between CISG and
Domestic Law, 25 J.L. & COM. 87, 90 (2006); Alexander S. Komarov, Internationality, Uniformity and
Observance of Good Faith as Criteria in Interpretation of CISG: Some Remarks on Article 7(1), 25 J.L.
& COM. 75, 80 (2006).